puzzle of why these projects remain so appealing regardless of scant results
and continued critiques. Inmy view, the rule of law rhetoric has facilitated the
problematic continuation of projects and has further decreased the demands
for delivering the economic growth originally promised. The constant practice
of slippagebetweentheseROLconceptionsandthewaytheyaredeployed
by the units working on these projects has two effects. First, it allows policymakers
to be unclear about what they mean when they invoke the ROL.
Second, it allows policymakers to not take seriously the critiques of their
projects or the evidence of disappointing results by engaging in a practice of
“goal-post-shifting.” When pressed by a critique of the premises with which
they introduced their projects, they turn to a multiplicity of other objectives
or aspirations that their projects are also supposed to pursue in relation to
different conceptions of the ROL. I argue that this practice enables policymakers
to disregard important critiques of their projects’ premises and of
unfavorable results. Finally, this slippage encourages a continued confusion
among different groups that may have very different agendas. I will discuss
what I consider to be other negative effects of this dynamic, namely
lack of transparency, waste of resources, and justification for opportunistic
behavior.
Judicial reform. I will begin with an example of how I think this practice
works in analyzing projects of judicial reform, of which Public Sector Unit
and Legal are in charge. These projects started with the premise that an independent
and effective judiciary is a necessary precondition for economic
development.93 This premise became a marching tune and was included
in these groups’ reports and academic papers justifying their projects. It
was argued that merely enacting property and contract laws would not suffice
to attract investment unless independent and effective courts enforced
them. Effective courts were in charge of setting in motion the private sector.
The assumption was that courts would ensure calculability and predictability
of economic transactions by effectively enforcing contracts and
acting independently to prevent governments’ impingement on property
rights.
The first judicial reform project of the Bank was delivered as a “technical
assistance loan” to Venezuela in 1992. Gradually, the scope of these projects
expanded to include aspects related to judicial independence, judicial training,
court administration and case management, control of corruption,
appointment of judges, criminal justice, and government accountability.94