Decision tree method
The Technical Regulatory System. In 2001, the RAN responded to the need for improved risk
management by introducing its Technical Regulatory System (TRS). The TRS aimed to
provide assurance to the Chief of Navy that the technical integrity of naval materiel is
maintained from design inception to disposal, i.e. the full life of the asset. EngServ were the
RAN’s only internal engineering resource. The corner-stone of the TRS was the concept of
Competent Authorities (CAs). To gain accreditation as a CA, staff had to be authorised as
having the qualifications, experience and demonstrated technical competence required for
the work being performed. The RAN recognized that there is high staff turnover in the
Defence industry. To counter this, accreditation was linked to positions rather than
individuals. The RAN identified levels of technical decisions based on the level of risk
involved. The decisions with the highest risk were allocated to the most senior positions. Staff
in positions at lower levels were not allowed (i.e. accredited) to make the highest risk
decisions. The structure adopted by the RAN articulated six levels of technical proficiency
similar to that defined by the Australian Qualification Framework (AQF). These levels are
applied to specific technical positions within each CA. Normally each position required a
general level of competency and specific discipline requirements. This shows how the TRS
used competency frameworks to manage risk through the technical decisions defined by
position descriptions. It ensured that individuals only made decisions in areas where they
had demonstrated competence. Importantly, the RAN process focuses risk assessment on
the individual, and risk is rarely discussed as a group of experts, so we must use
conventional decision tree theory to examine what is happening, rather than contemporary
theories such as post-normal risk management and complexity theory.