wider international community may validate,
invalidate, or alter the strategic objectives
sought, the campaign plan pursued, or the
tactics employed. Although these complexities
are not new, they are becoming increasingly
salient in the contemporary setting.
The aphorism “strategy proposes but
tactics disposes” is important here. Unless
strategy includes a tactical view, it may seek
objectives that are practically unachievable,
or it may miscalculate the costs and benefits
likely to emerge from a conflict. These costs
are not limited to the direct economic and
social impacts of war on the belligerents but
extend to international public opinion and
international politics. The consequences of
tactical actions can, more than ever, decide
not only who wins the war but also the shape
of the peace that follows it.
Equally, tactics need to serve strategy,
and tactical action without strategic purpose
is merely senseless violence. The strategic
direction of a war needs to be intimately
connected to the details of the warfare being
conducted to ensure both that it is making
realistic demands and that the warfare
remains appropriate to the wider conduct
of the war. Moreover, tactics need to be
constantly seeking to contribute to the ends
laid down by strategy with economy and
efficiency, and with nuance shaped by an
awareness of the wider conduct of the war.
A two-way conversation between strategy
and tactics is fundamental to the successful
prosecution of any war.
Sound theory attempts to deal with
this reality. The German school of military
theorists that emerged around the end of
the 18th century, for example, saw war as a
“giant demonic force, a huge spiritual entity,
surcharged with brutal energy.”2 For those
responsible for the management of this beast