Reform of the banking system
Simultaneously with the other reforms, the financial institutions in CEE countries
are undergoing a major reform. While under central planning most of the banks were mere
branches of one bank, with very little independent decision-making, the restructuring of the
banking system creates a system of (increasingly) independent banks. However, the politicians
still wish to use these banks, as they previously did under the old system, primarily as a
distribution system for government transfers through special credit quotas and pass-through
loans subsidies. Policies of this form have often crippled the systems ability to allocate capital
to non-favoured borrowers and serverly retarded its capital allocative efficiencies (Fry, 1988;
Calomiris, 1993; Borish et al, 1995). The problem within these economies is not the level of
savings or a lack of suitable financial institutions, however the allocation of these savings and
financial resources to inefficient uses due to inappropriate incentives. In many cases the
economy’s financial resources are allocated via a political agenda, rather than economic
criteria. This leads to bureaucratic corruption and inefficient use of resources in political rent
seeking (Gelb, 1989).
Accumulated bad debts, from during the period of centrally planned economies,
have created problems in two directions: they have firstly caused a rationing of the supply of
credit, and secondly, hampered the speed of privatisation and land restitution. As long as this
problem is not solved, a well defined system of property rights and incentives, necessary for
efficient decision making and investments will not develop. Many CEE countries have tried to
rectify this problem by providing debt rescheduling and new loans at subsidised interest rates,
often zero, for previous “old” debts e.g. Romania. This is just correcting the symptoms, not
the cause, which is an initial wealth problem exaggerated by the allocation of inappropriate
debts from the previous system. A partial or complete right-off of pre-reform debts will likely
be required to correct this problem. It should however be done in partnership with the
commercial lending organisations, or else there is likely to be a credibility problem. Where all
parties negotiate a fair and equitable right-off of a portion of these bad debts returning the
enterprise to long-term economic viability or liquidation if acceptable terms can not be
reached. This will also ensure that only those economically viable farmers will receive
assistance. This approach has been successfully used in market economies going through
transitional reforms, e.g. New Zealand’s debt right-off program in the late eighties after
removal of agricultural supports in 1984.
Credit supply in the system is further limited, because of the decline of the economy
during the transition. The CEE countries can not generate enough sources of capital needed as
a basis for development of their economies. Those resources that are available are being
moved to the sectors that are providing the greatest risk/return trade-off, presently not
agriculture. Reduced international financing in addition has hampered the speed of the reform.
Additional problems for efficient operation of the intermediary institutions are due
to a lack of experience and skills of banking officials. The market mechanism requires a
different approach for the evaluation of loan applications. Hence bankers need to be educated
in the use of credit scoring models and other advanced techniques. For the agricultural sector,
bankers need additional knowledge relevant to the cash flows in the sector. As an example of
the level of difficult these institutions are facing, D’browski and Jamrozik (1997) point out