The citizenry is more inclined to accept increased tax payments when it sees a clear link between payment of the tax and improved government services. When taxes are levied and collected at the central government level,that link can be hard to see. Payments disappear into the national treasury, and the funds get used in ways that have little identifiable consequence or impact on the taxpayer. The relationship can be radically different in the local fiscal structure. The governing body levies a tax for local roads, for example: the tax is collected locally,the money is spent on the local roads,and the citizenry can see the link between the tax and the service.The citizenry may be more willing to accept imposition of a tax if the link between it and a particular service is apparent. The effect is both on the politics of getting taxes adopted and on compliance. Any local taxpayer will be a greater relative contributor to the local budget than he or she is to a national budget,and any tax not paid will make a greater difference to that budget. The consequence of nonpayment seems more apparent, so compliance is more likely. The cheater on local taxes is stealing from neighbors, not some distant central bureaucrats. And noncompliance may be more visible to the general public,with some resulting prospect of social pressure to comply. Revenue mobilization involves politics and compliance incentives,not only technological capacity,and local governments can have the advantage in those other areas.2