Producers respond to higher prices with investment in more modem equipment for cultivation and transport of drugs, leading to increased competitiveness and greater profitability for the illegal enterprise. Moreover, ruppliers prefer cocaine because it is easy to conceal and transport, and its prices arc much higher than prices for marijuana, which is bulky and harder to transport. By contrast, enforcers prefer marijuana because its bulk looks impressive before the cameras, and seizure of a few tons increases productivity measures at lower risk than for cocaine. Superficially, program performance measured in tons per seizure for marijuana is higher than for low-bulk but high-enforcement-risk cocaine. Thus, according to law enforcement experts, enforcement of marijuana laws contributes to higher marijuana prices and lower supplies, which drive people to harder drugs (Lindsey 1986). In this context, the 1986 recommendation of Georgia's ttorney general to make possession of marijuana a felony instead of a misdemeano (Hop.kins 1986) can be viewed as either the selection of an inappropriate solution contrary to valid and reliable data on policy impact, or simply part of the rush by dected officials racing to "get tough on criminals." Based on available evidence, such a law would increase the use of hard drugs and make enforcement even more difficult. The "get tough" approach exemplified by zero tolerance effectively defines an ill-structured problem as a simple enforcement matter. It also has the effect of criminalizing otherwise law-abiding citizens (including the current president), stimulating gangsterism on a world scale (The Economist 2009a), and even driving some children to suicide (Fisher 2009a). By intensifying needless shame and sdf-doubt, zero-tolerance laws ostracize and isolate many of the best junior and senior high school students unlucky enough to be caught by ualous administrators. Stigmatized as reprobates with no apparent futures, they are often driven to suicide.