Explaining the Failure of Thailand’s Anti-corruption
Regime
Despite the presence of strong anti-corruption policies, state and regulatory
capture may persist and thrive in the highest echelons of government.
This article explores such a case, that of Thailand under former Prime
Minister, Thaksin Shinawatra. The author argues that the primary explanation
for this contradiction lies in Thailand’s post-1997 anti-corruption
framework. Because of the ascendancy of a business–politics nexus more
powerful in blocking reformthan Thai constitutional drafters had anticipated,
and because of the decline in political contestability as a result of Thaksin’s
control of both the legislature and the executive, the stage was set for a dramatic
increase in the levels of state capture. The author suggests that effective
control of such political corruption calls for a strategy which extends far
beyond the technocratic approaches used by Thai reformers in the mid to late
1990s.