Evolution of IPPs in Mexico
In the early 1990s, before the creation of the North American Free Trade Area, there was growing interest among Mexican authorities and US developers in creating an independent power industry in Mexico. To meet expected power needs, the Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) planned for an increase in installed power-plant capacity from 33,000 MW, projected for 1995, to 45,000 MW in 2005. About half of the new capacity and one quarter of total capacity was expected to come from IPPs. The government of President Carlos Salinas started to negotiate two projects, the Carbon Dos coal-fired project with Mission Energy, and the Rosarito project with a US-Canadian-Mexican group. A Mexican law authorising IPPs was passed in 1993. It seemed to be a ‘win-win’ situation, since Mexico needed the power and the US developers, right next door, had the skills to make it happen.
Late in 1993 regulations to interpret and implement the enabling IPP legislation were
issued. Power projects larger than 30 MW would be required to go through a competitive bidding process. Additional rules were spelled out for projects smaller than 30 MW. The Samalayuca II project, which was competitively bid and awarded in March 1992, was not affected by the legislation, but some other large project proposals had to be scrapped. The Carbon Dos and Rosarito projects kept moving during this period.
Also in 1993 the pacto among government, business groups and labour unions was rene-
gotiated. The price of power was reduced to help businesses become more competitive. As a result, the Carbon Dos and Rosarito projects, and many proposals for small ‘inside the fence’ power projects, became uneconomical and were cancelled. A power project ‘inside the fence’ is located within a company’s industrial plant or complex, is owned by the company and is intended to serve mainly the needs of that plant or complex. Sometimes excess power is sold to other users. Developers that had been interested in Mexico diverted their attention to other countries with brighter prospects, such as Argentina. Prospects for new IPP ventures were further dimmed by the economic slowdown after the devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994.
Throughout this period negotiations between the sponsors and the Mexican government on the Samalayuca II project kept moving along, albeit at a delayed pace. The industry was watching the progress of this project to determine whether IPPs could become viable in Mexico. After the Samalayuca II project financing closed in May 1996, perceptions were generally favourable. The energy minister, the head of the CFE and President Ernesto Zedillo made reinforcing statements to the effect that the country was committed to IPPs. Developers became excited about Mexico again. The request for proposal (RFP) for the natural-gas-fired Merida III project in Yucatan drew six qualified world-class bidders. Additional power and pipeline projects were begun shortly afterwards. Even though the project structure moved from build-lease-transfer (BLT), as used with Samalayuca II, to build-operate-transfer (BOT), as used with Merida III, and build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT), Samalayuca was the first quasi-IPP venture in Mexico and blazed the trail for future IPP ventures.