2) The predation critique
A second objection against basing environmentalism on compassion was that suffering—
in the form of death, disease, predation, and so on—is an inherent part of nature, and the
attempt to eliminate it altogether is an outcome of an unrealistic, perhaps over-romantic
view of nature that contradicts ecological principles. It was argued that if we followed
our desire for the welfare of all sentient beings to its logical conclusion, rather than
respecting nature, we would need to alter it radically; in particular, we would need to
prevent animals from preying upon each other wherever we could. Some parables suggest
that this idea is not as offensive to Buddhists as it is to some environmentalists, who
would probably be dismayed by the uncharacteristic portrayal of certain animals in the
Jātaka Tales and in other Buddhist stories, such as the snake that sheltered the Buddha
from the rain, or the tiger that slept by Milarepa‘s side.
In the next chapter, I will argue that emptiness implies that there is no such thing
as the ―nature of a tiger,‖ and in fact, several Buddhist stories suggest that, in the
presence of an enlightened being, normally aggressive animals become submissive
instead. All the same, although the predation critique is perfectly valid for one who
displays relative love and compassion, such as the animal welfarist whose views were
examined in chapter 1, it does not apply to bodhicitta. Since the bodhisattva’s love is
generated in union with emptiness, she does not infer any views, any ‗oughts,‘ ‗shoulds,‘
or ‗musts,‘ and especially, she will not interfere with other beings‘ way of life. To desire
the happiness of all beings, when beings and their afflictions are viewed as empty, will
not logically necessitate any intervention on behalf of suffering beings. Someone who
was under the grip of a deluded perspective, perceiving beings, suffering, and actions as
real might believe that she had to put an end to all this misery. The bodhisattva, on the
other hand, would ultimately perceive only emptiness.
Of course, this just shows, once again, that an environmentalist cannot appeal to
bodhicitta or emptiness to support his environmentally motivated decisions. It points to
the problem we have noted repeatedly, and which we shall encounter again below, that as
long as it is interpreted as the negation of views, emptiness cannot be used to defend
2) The predation critique
A second objection against basing environmentalism on compassion was that suffering—
in the form of death, disease, predation, and so on—is an inherent part of nature, and the
attempt to eliminate it altogether is an outcome of an unrealistic, perhaps over-romantic
view of nature that contradicts ecological principles. It was argued that if we followed
our desire for the welfare of all sentient beings to its logical conclusion, rather than
respecting nature, we would need to alter it radically; in particular, we would need to
prevent animals from preying upon each other wherever we could. Some parables suggest
that this idea is not as offensive to Buddhists as it is to some environmentalists, who
would probably be dismayed by the uncharacteristic portrayal of certain animals in the
Jātaka Tales and in other Buddhist stories, such as the snake that sheltered the Buddha
from the rain, or the tiger that slept by Milarepa‘s side.
In the next chapter, I will argue that emptiness implies that there is no such thing
as the ―nature of a tiger,‖ and in fact, several Buddhist stories suggest that, in the
presence of an enlightened being, normally aggressive animals become submissive
instead. All the same, although the predation critique is perfectly valid for one who
displays relative love and compassion, such as the animal welfarist whose views were
examined in chapter 1, it does not apply to bodhicitta. Since the bodhisattva’s love is
generated in union with emptiness, she does not infer any views, any ‗oughts,‘ ‗shoulds,‘
or ‗musts,‘ and especially, she will not interfere with other beings‘ way of life. To desire
the happiness of all beings, when beings and their afflictions are viewed as empty, will
not logically necessitate any intervention on behalf of suffering beings. Someone who
was under the grip of a deluded perspective, perceiving beings, suffering, and actions as
real might believe that she had to put an end to all this misery. The bodhisattva, on the
other hand, would ultimately perceive only emptiness.
Of course, this just shows, once again, that an environmentalist cannot appeal to
bodhicitta or emptiness to support his environmentally motivated decisions. It points to
the problem we have noted repeatedly, and which we shall encounter again below, that as
long as it is interpreted as the negation of views, emptiness cannot be used to defend
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..