Frances M. Kamm has argued that physical distance is, sometimes,
relevant per se to our duty to give aid to strangers.1 She has thus
responded to views such as those of Peter Singer and Peter Unger, who
both argued that distance cannot be a morally relevant factor to our
duties to prevent suffering, and that therefore there is no moral difference,
insofar as distance is considered, between not saving the life of a child
nearby and not contributing to charities that would save the life of a child
in a distant country.2 If not saving the nearby child is wrong, then not
making the charitable contribution must be wrong too, whatever the
distance. Physical distance is but one factor, and perhaps not a major
factor, in explaining our reluctance to equate not contributing to charities
and letting a child die nearby. Whatever the importance of distance for
the larger issue of what we owe to needy, distant people, Kamm has the
merit of focusing the question of distance per se, by presenting examples
so devised as to test our moral intuitions, and by providing a theoretical
justification for the view that the distance of needy people, sometimes,
morally matters per se in a way that makes taking care of what is near a
specific moral duty. Nevertheless, Kamm has not succeeded in her
attempt.