The differing concerns of these theoretical approaches can be further clarified by briefly observing how their proponents might look at political campaign-finance reform. A major goal of reformers has been to ban "soft money"-funds that can be raised in unlimited amounts from corporations, labor unions, and wealthy persons and spent for party-building activities, such as voter registration and get-out. campaigns. Soft money can also be expended on generic or issue advertising to promote generally a political party to influence the election prospects of particular candidates, so long as this is done without specifically endorsing their defeat or election. The Democratic and Republican Parties together raised more than half a billion dollars in soft money during the 1999-2000 election cycle.
After several years of struggle, the proponents of campaign-finance reform got Congress to enact in 2002 the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. A complex statute, it banned soft money contributions to national political parties, prohibited "issue ads" by private groups that mentioned candidates by name within sixty days of a national election, increased the limit on individual (“hard money") contributions to a candidate from $1,000 to $2,000 per national election, and more.
A group theorist would view the struggle to enact a campaign-finance reform law as a contest for advantage among various business, labor, and public interest groups and their supporters, as well as the political parties. Lobbying and other group tactics would be scrutinized. An institutionalist, in comparison, would focus on the problems presented by congressional structure and procedure in securing the enactment of legislation. These could include getting the bill to the House floor for debate, overcoming filibusters in the Senate, resolving differences in House and Senate versions of the bill, and avoiding a presidential veto. Much attention would be given to how a bill becomes law.
A rational-choice proponent would see members of Congress calculating how the content of reform legislation would affect ability to raise campaign money and to get reelected. Another of his or her concerns would be strategic behavior as when opponents propose amendments that, if adopted, would make the bill unacceptable to some of its supporters (a "poison pill"), or when reformers craft amendments to help gain or retain supporters. Self-interest would be seen as informing legislative behavior.
An elite theorist would see the legislative struggle here as one of interest primarily to top-level legislative and political leaders. Both proponents and opponents of reform would contend what they were trying to do was best e public. The elitist would hold that the mass public was neither interested nor informed, especially on the details of legislation.
The differing concerns of these theoretical approaches can be further clarified by briefly observing how their proponents might look at political campaign-finance reform. A major goal of reformers has been to ban "soft money"-funds that can be raised in unlimited amounts from corporations, labor unions, and wealthy persons and spent for party-building activities, such as voter registration and get-out. campaigns. Soft money can also be expended on generic or issue advertising to promote generally a political party to influence the election prospects of particular candidates, so long as this is done without specifically endorsing their defeat or election. The Democratic and Republican Parties together raised more than half a billion dollars in soft money during the 1999-2000 election cycle. After several years of struggle, the proponents of campaign-finance reform got Congress to enact in 2002 the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. A complex statute, it banned soft money contributions to national political parties, prohibited "issue ads" by private groups that mentioned candidates by name within sixty days of a national election, increased the limit on individual (“hard money") contributions to a candidate from $1,000 to $2,000 per national election, and more. A group theorist would view the struggle to enact a campaign-finance reform law as a contest for advantage among various business, labor, and public interest groups and their supporters, as well as the political parties. Lobbying and other group tactics would be scrutinized. An institutionalist, in comparison, would focus on the problems presented by congressional structure and procedure in securing the enactment of legislation. These could include getting the bill to the House floor for debate, overcoming filibusters in the Senate, resolving differences in House and Senate versions of the bill, and avoiding a presidential veto. Much attention would be given to how a bill becomes law. A rational-choice proponent would see members of Congress calculating how the content of reform legislation would affect ability to raise campaign money and to get reelected. Another of his or her concerns would be strategic behavior as when opponents propose amendments that, if adopted, would make the bill unacceptable to some of its supporters (a "poison pill"), or when reformers craft amendments to help gain or retain supporters. Self-interest would be seen as informing legislative behavior. An elite theorist would see the legislative struggle here as one of interest primarily to top-level legislative and political leaders. Both proponents and opponents of reform would contend what they were trying to do was best e public. The elitist would hold that the mass public was neither interested nor informed, especially on the details of legislation.
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