The corporate governance system of the insurance industry in Taiwan, which holds board
members fully responsible for cases of bankruptcy, offers an interesting environment in
which to explore its unique regulatory impact on insurers’ efficiency. Using a unique
panel data from Taiwan, this paper investigates whether corporate governance
variables – including insider ownership, voting rights, cash-flow rights, and board
composition–influence the efficiency performance of insurance companies.The analysis
suggests that a high concentration of voting rights and cash-flow rights in controlling
shareholders’ownershiphasprevailedinTaiwan’sinsuranceindustry.Ouroverallevidence
shows that corporate governance plays an important role in influencing efficiency for
property-liability insurers in Taiwan. Specifically,insider ownership, cash-flow rights,and
the presence of outside direct or shave positive impacts, whereas concentrated ownership,
deviation between voting rights and cash-flow rights,board size,and the presence of CEO
duality have negative impacts on insurers’ efficiency.