The theory of representative bureaucracy thus begins with the assumption that there are good reasons for public agencies to be organized the way they are (i.e., undemocratically) and that these undemocratic agencies exercise considerable political power. As Kenneth Meier puts it, “The theory of representative bureaucracy begins by recognizing the realities of politics. In a complex polity such as the United States, not all aspects of policy decisions are resolved in the ‘political’ branches of government” (1975, 527). The basis of bureaucratic power is assumed
to derive from the discretionary decision making authority that, as a practical matter, has to be granted to them because not all implementation and enforcement scenarios can be conceived of and accounted for in statutes. Elected officials may have numerous tools at their disposal to restrict bureaucratic power, but strong forces place practical limits on the use of these tools. Public support of programs or agency objectives, the information advantage bureaucrats often hold over elected officials because of their technical expertise, and simple political expediency all work to limit the constraints placed on bureaucratic power.