Contests Over Power and the Dynamics of Fear
As I have argued elsewhere,[19] the Rwandan Revolution of 1959 occurred in large part because of widespread rural grievances. This strong disaffection from the regime was articulated by a Hutu counterelite (at times supported by Tutsi moderates linked with the RADER party), who were pushed into more radical action by the intransigence of the monarchists. Powerful external institutions (the Belgian administration, the Catholic Church, and at certain points the United Nations) were also involved, to be sure. Although their support helped the revolution succeed, the events in Rwanda were not engineered from outside; this was an "assisted revolution,"[20] not an "imposed revolution." The difference is significant, for the concept of an assisted revolution reflects certain realities of the years immediately following independence in 1962. Many rural people had a stake in this new political order, and they shared a strong commitment not to return to the "old order" in later years.
To interpret the events of the 1990s in Rwanda, one must take account of the rural population's disaffection (and in some areas outright anger among many Hutu) toward the behavior of many Tutsi authorities under colonial rule, as well as the intense struggles over land that accompanied the decolonization process. Moreover, one tragic result of the conflicts during 1959 and after (continuing through 1964) was the exodus of large numbers of Rwandans, mostly Tutsi, who took refuge in neighboring countries. It was these exiles, and their children, who organized the Rwandan Patriotic Front in Uganda in the late 1980s. In October 1990, the RPF led a military attack against Rwanda; they sought to win the right for Rwandans in exile to return and, the RPF asserted, they wanted to push for democratization of the authoritarian Rwandan government.
At the time of the RPF attacks, official rhetoric claimed that the Habyarimana government represented all rural segments in the country, and that this government was a continuation of the ideals of the 1959 Revolution. In reality, the government was dominated by a wealthy, powerful clique (the "Akazu"). By the end of the 1980s, widespread popular disaffection had weakened the regime, particularly in the southern and central areas of the country; intense struggles (mainly among Hutu) based on class and regional differences threatened the continued hegemony of those in power.[21] To be sure, Tutsi were discriminated against in education and access to government jobs; but before October 1990, systematic harassment of Tutsi was not characteristic of the Habyarimana regime. At that time, Tutsi did not face exclusion from private sector employment or local-level positions in the teaching, agriculture, or medical fields.
In the wake of the attacks of 1990, Habyarimana accused the RPF of seeking to overthrow the Hutu government and reestablish monarchical rule and Tutsi hegemony--in other words, he accused them of seeking to reverse the results of the 1959 Revolution. The RPF vigorously denied that this was their goal. Nonetheless, the invasion resuscitated conflicts and fears from the recent past. Even if many rural Rwandans of any social category chafed under the authoritarian rule of Habyarimana and his clique, they were not necessarily eager to embrace rule by the RPF. In intellectual terms, then, the ethnic polarization that occurred in Rwanda during the 1990s, culminating in the genocide of 1994, was in many respects a continuation of the evolving tensions of late colonial rule.[22] Therefore, in efforts to seek pathways to a more peaceful future for Rwanda, it is necessary to understand the complexity of these contested histories of ethnic relationships and their connections to the Revolution of 1959.
But it is also necessary to move beyond such dichotomized debates. Exploring parallels between the violent conflicts of the early 1990s and the events of decolonization in Rwanda would appear to be particularly fruitful. Three such parallels will be discussed briefly below. One concerns the marginalization of moderates in the recent history of Rwanda. A second parallel is seen in the dynamic of fear associated with political competition in these struggles. A third (and related) focus highlights the political patterns that accompany major crises of governance in Rwanda's recent politics.