แสดงตัวอย่างข้อความที่ยังไม่ฟอร์แมต: For Instructor Use Only Instructor’s Manual Aegis Analytical Coprporation's Strategic Alliances Paul M. Olk and Joan Winn LEARNING OBJECTIVES This case is intended for a graduate or advanced undergraduate course in strategic management but would also be appropriate for electives in entrepreneurship, strategic alliance management, channel distribution, sales and sales management. The case is positioned to illustrate the challenges of managing strategic alliances for a venturebacked, high technology, small company and to allow students to analyze the strategic, formal and behavioral issues that are a part of a strategic alliance. Alliances, considered to be a ‘relational contract’ form of governance, involve both formal, legal issues as well as more informal, behavioral components. Companies cannot solely rely upon the formal mechanisms to make an effective alliance. Managing the behavioral side is particularly difficult for a small company partnering with a larger company. Since these are marketing arrangements, these bring up issues related to distribution channels and the management of a value network. The technology and industry issues allow its use in a topics course in strategic alliances, technology management, or new venture financing. In total, the case should increase students’ understanding of: • • • • The strategic use of alliances for small companies for leveraging resources The behavioral dimensions of managing a relational contract form of governance The challenges of how a smaller company can influence a much larger partner The concepts of value networks and creating add-on products for downstream companies CASE OVERVIEW Aegis Analytical Corporation was founded in 1995 by Gretchen L. Jahn and Justin O. Neway to provide process manufacturing software and consulting services to pharmaceutical and biotech manufacturers. Aegis developed a software program that quickly compiles disparate data into a single report. Within minutes, the program develops reports on drug tests and manufacturing quality that previously might take months to compile. With a target market of large pharmaceutical manufacturers, Aegis knew it faced a challenge of getting “in the door” of these companies and of convincing them that Aegis and its software would be around for awhile. To help with the marketing, Aegis formed two alliances, both with companies—that at one time were independent but now were small divisions of large companies— that manufactured and sold complementary products to pharmaceutical manufacturing companies. While there were advantages to partnering with these divisions of Honeywell and Rockwell, most notably the visibility and credibility that these big names offered, many disadvantages developed. Most important is that Aegis’s product was just one of many that Honeywell or Rockwell would promote. While there were incentives in place to encourage Honeywell and Rockwell to promote Aegis’s product, after a year neither strategic alliance had resulted in a sale of Aegis’s software. Aegis’s founders were faced with the decisions of whether they should continue with either or both of the alliances. If they chose to continue the alliances, what could they as a small company do to encourage their much larger partners to promote the Aegis product? If they chose to terminate the alliances, can they rely only upon their internal sales staff to adequately promote and sell their product? What would be the effect on their reputation by no longer partnering with Rockwell or Honeywell? Another option might be to attempt to set up new alliances? If so, what steps should they take to increase the probability of success? SUGGESTED READINGS This case nicely accompanies several book chapters on managing partner relationships. Specifically, Yves Doz and Gary Hamel (Alliance Advantage: The Art of Creating Value Through Partnering, Harvard Business School Press, 1998) discuss in chapters 7 and 8 how to learn and adjust an alliance over time and how to manage the balance of power and dependence. In chapter 7, they demonstrate that partners need to initiate cycles of learning, reevaluation and revised conditions. As an alliance evolves, the partners will learn more about the task of the alliance, the market for the product, the compatibility with one another. This will lead to a reevaluation of the value creation potential for the alliance and the amount of value captured by a partner. Following this is a revised condition stage, in which partners modify their expectations or scope of the alliance, or change the tasks or the way they interact. Aegis currently is in the reevaluation stage and is considering what it should consider in the revision stage. In chapter 8, they focus on how contributions to an alliance affect the balance of power in an alliance, but that balance shifts over time if one partner starts to learn more from the alliance than the other partner. In the case, it is not clear that either Aegis or its respective partner in either of the alliances is learning much from one another. One option for Aegis is to restructure either of the alliances in order to learn from the relationship. A second set of readings that could accompany the case are chapters 7, 9-12 in James D. Bamford, Benjamin Gomes-Casseres, Michael S. Robinson’s Mastering Alliance Strategy: A Comprehensive Guide to Design, Management, and Organization (John Wiley & Sons, 2003). In these short chapters that mostly appeared earlier in a publication called “The Alliance Analyst,” the topics of relationship management, governing collaboration, making joint decisions and managing without control are covered. Chapter 7 focuses on what goes into an alliance agreement. The subsequent chapters provide recommended actions for managers to take in managing an alliance relationship. These recommendations can be introduced to the students to see how they apply to the Aegis situation. For those seeking additional information, instructors may turn to the literature on strategic alliance control. Partner influence represents a central issue in the study of strategic alliances. As noted, economists and lawyers refer to an alliance as a “relational contract” (Williamson, 1985). From the initial thoughts on this in Peter Killing’s (1983) study of international joint ventures to more recent work on distribution channels (Davis and Spekman, 2004), control over the alliance or of the other partner is central to these common arrangements. During this time, the interest has shifted from emphasizing formal, legal mechanisms of control (e.g., contract specifications, equity splits, board representation) to operational or behavioral control (e.g., who makes the day to day decisions, how often do the various companies meet). [See for example, Yan and Gray (1994) or Mjoen and Tallman (1997)]. This is particularly true for understanding the operations of an on-going alliance, where the behavioral side of the relationship has had an opportunity to develop. The majority of researchers’ interest in operational control, however, is between two parties which are considered equal. What is unique about the Aegis situation is that this is not an alliance between equals. Rather, it raises the question of how the smaller, and less powerful, company can influence the larger, more bureaucratic partner. This case also highlights the different strategies of each company. Larger companies are often encouraged to take an “options” approach to alliances (e.g., Kogut (1991). That is, when there is high uncertainty, they should invest in several small, complementary alliances at the same time. As more information is collected, and it becomes clearer which alliance has the greatest potential, the larger company can terminate the other alliances and, perhaps, internalize the best alliance. For the smaller company, however, there may not be multiple options. Because of resource constraints, the smaller company may not be able to invest in more than one or two partnerships. Moreover, if a particular partnership is terminated, the small company may not survive. While there is no evidence in the case that Aegis is seeking to be purchased by either Honeywell or Rockwell, or that either of these companies is investing in Aegis as a precursor to an acquisition, it is a possibility. Finally, as revealed in the case, the legal terms of each agreement and the formal relationship between the company and each partner appear to encourage collaboration and the promotion of sales. In discussing the disappointing results, students will begin to appreciate the importance of maintaining operational influence in an alliance and of the levers available to even the seemingly dependent partner. TEACHING SUGGESTIONS The instructor may want to begin by asking the students to explain why Aegis turned to alliances to market its products. Following a list of advantages for Aegis, the class should generate a list of advantages for Honeywell and Rockwell. The instructor should then ask why these large companies have not sold Aegis’s product. While students may raise issues of market demand for the product or question the appropriateness of customers via their alliances, it is clear from the information in the case that the partners are not adequately promoting Aegis’s product. This should turn to a discussion of whether the right incentives are in place for the larger companies. An examination of the contractual provisions may lead to a range of opinions about the contract, but the general conclusion will likely be that the contracts are reasonable and have the potential to benefit all parties involved. If the problem is not entirely in the contract, students should turn their attention towards the relationship side of the arrangement. This will prompt a discussion of the motives for each partner, what assets each partner has contrib