Results
A total of 22 states, including D.C., do not reference substance use disorders in their statutory definitions of mental illness (Table 1). Of the 29 that do, eight explicitly include substance use disorders and 21 explicitly exclude them as qualifying mental illnesses for the purpose of commitment. Nine states have separate, additional inpatient commitment laws specifically permitting involuntary hospitalization for substance use disorders (two of which are states that otherwise exclude substance use disorders in their definitions of mental illness). In sum, 17 state statutes appear to explicitly permit involuntary hospitalization for substance use disorders either by inclusion of substance use disorders in definitions of mental illness or through separate inpatient commitment laws. An additional 15 state statutes do not reference substance use disorders such that, short of prevailing case law or administrative regulation, they appear to passively permit involuntary hospitalization. [A flow diagram and a U.S. map illustrating these findings are included in the online data supplement.] Definitional language varies greatly from state to state in terms of clarity and specificity. For instance, Washington State (x 71.05.020) defines a “mental disorder” vaguely as “any organic, mental, or emotional impairment which has substantial adverse effects on an individual’s cognitive or volitional functions.” In contrast, Oregon’s (ORS x 426.495) mental illness definition (“Chronic schizophrenia, a chronic major affective disorder, a chronic paranoid disorder or another chronic psychotic mental disorder”) is more specific. Some states clearly exclude or include substance use disorders in their mental illness definitions. Alabama’s statute [x 22–52–1.1 (1)] specifically excludes substance use disorders (“Mental illness, as used herein, specifically excludes the primary diagnosis of . . . substance abuse, including alcoholism”). Whereas Tennessee (x 33–1-101) specifically includes alcoholism or drug dependence (“Mentally ill individual means an individual who suffers from a psychiatric disorder, alcoholism, or drug dependence”). Among the ten states that have separate commitment laws for substance use disorders, language regarding substance use disorders varies even more than that defining mental illness. This may in part reflect the frequent conflation (for either medical or legal purposes) of intoxication, substance abuse, and addiction and a historical carryover of distinguishing alcohol dependence from other drug dependence.
Discussion We believe this compilation to be the first of its kind for at least the past two decades. Civil commitment statutes affect clinical practice because clinicians assess dangerousness and hospitalization criteria partly on their understanding of existing legal criteria (22).The ambiguity and inconsistency of statutory language may complicate such efforts. State statutes regarding the hospitalization of persons with substance use disorders have largely remained stagnant since the 1970s despite progress in understanding the etiology and neurobiological pathology of substance use disorders. An abundance of evidence now associates addiction with changes in brain structure and function that persist well beyond the cessation of drug use and detoxification (23–27). Unlike views prevalent in the 1970s, expert views on substance use disorders among addiction researchers and clinicians are now consistent in describing substance use disorders as chronic brain diseases. Importantly, addiction is not simply a neurologic disease but a mental illness. It changes fundamental aspects of an individual’s personality—cognition, emotions, and behaviors—that implicate decision-making capacity and self-determination (28–30). Research on treatment effectiveness has also grown considerably. By 1990 several authoritative reviews emerged spanning tens of thousands of patients enrolled in federally funded studies demonstrating that treatment leads to significant and enduring declines in drug use (31,32).Subsequently,the1990s Drug Abuse Treatment Outcome Study provided evidence regarding which aspects of addiction treatment were most effective, ultimately emphasizing the importance of retention in treatment (33,34). Most recently, the literature has evolved to demonstrate that coerced treatment for substance use disorder scan, in some cases, be as effective as voluntary treatment (35– 39). As with other serious mental illnesses, involuntary hospitalization may be a necessary tool that allows clinicians to fully stabilize, assess, and plan (for example, arrange for mobile outreach or intensive case management) for these patients with complex conditions (1). There is limited literature on the subject of psychiatrists’ knowledge of and attitudes toward commitment criteria. However, the few available studies have repeatedly found that surveyed psychiatrists are often not familiar with the specific criteria and procedures contained in their state’s statutes (5,22,40–42). In addition, some researchers have found that non respondents (that is, those who do not reply to surveys) are even less familiar with the criteria than respondents (43). It is also not uncommon for psychiatrists to be influenced by non-legal criteria, such as logistical constraints involving bed availability, workload, overcrowding, and a lack of less restrictive alternatives, despite statutory guidelines to the contrary (44–46). Conversely, in states where civil commitment is permitted for substance use disorders, it is often not used (8,47–49). A 2006 American Psychiatric Association poll of its members (N=739) concluded that 99% of psychiatrists agreed with commitment for “dangerousness,” but only 22% agreed with commitment for substance use disorders (41). Although these findings do not comment on psychiatrists’ attitudes about commitment for dangerous (“gravely disabled”) persons with substance use disorders they do highlight that in the broader mental health community there is disagreement about whether substance use disorders should be treated, legally, in the same manner as other severe mental illnesses. We recognize that there are significant concerns, ideologically, logistically, and financially, with any standardization of civil commitment and, possibly, with any expansion, especially in areas of the country with relatively limited resources. First, as already mentioned, there is no clear agreement in the health care community about the best treatment practices for individuals who have gravely disabling substance use disorders. We see debate as an opportunity for addiction specialists to strive for best practices in this area. Second, and perhaps even more important in our current era of cost containment, widening the scope of persons who qualify for inpatient hospitalization to include gravely disabled individuals with substance use disorders may further stress the already limited number of hospital beds. It is possible, however, that shifting dollars to longer-term inpatient care or stabilizing patients to transition them to less restrictive levels of care (such as residential or assertive community treatment) may actually improve overall system efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Additional resources are clearly needed for more effective early interventions that prevent the degree of deterioration that necessitates such a high level of care. It is hoped that implementation of the Affordable Care Act will expand such funding. Third, with approximately half of states already permitting (explicitly or passively) inpatient commitment for persons with substance use disorders, one may ask why the option of involuntary hospitalization for gravely disabled substance users across all states would change the standard of care. We acknowledge that statutory language and the realities of clinical practice may not be closely aligned. However, we suggest that excluding substance use disorders from the statutory definition of mental illness for involuntary hospitalization is both scientifically outdated and may withhold a potentially life-saving treatment option from an extremely vulnerable population.