February 20, before receiving $6 billion in bailout funds on November 14. As detailed by a
bankruptcy court examiner (Valukas 2010), E&Y ‘‘were aware of but did not question
Lehman’s use and nondisclosure’’ of ‘‘window-dressing’’ repo transactions to ‘‘manage’’ its
balance sheet around period ends,10 to make it appear that it was smaller and less leveraged
than it was, leading the examiner to conclude there was ‘‘sufficient credible evidence to support
a finding by a trier of fact’’ that E&Y had failed to meet professional auditing standards.
Consistent with these examples, Desai, Rajgopal, and Yu (2013) find large sample evidence
that auditors showed no ability to assess bank risk and predict weaknesses in the lead up to the
financial crisis in contrast to the ability of short sellers to do the same.