Banks, however, may not demand clearinghouses, or may support clearinghouses in which only banks get access to the credit data. As a theoretical matter, the private returns to banks are lower (or put another way, the private costs are higher) than the social returns to information sharing under a number of plausible scenarios. Moreover, because of the closed nature of bank lending in many developing countries, where banks only lend to the elite-their depositors-and these depositors largely borrow from their bank, the incentives for banks voluntarily to share information about their borrowers is significantly diminished. As Tressel argues, relationship lending and below-market deposit rates link banks and borrowers, but new borrowers are not part of the equation.0 7 In a number of developing countries, public credit bureaus were created in the 1990s only after massive economic shocks to the financial system, or conversely, only after long periods of economic stability, during which the lack of credit bureaus may have delayed more rapid growth.