a result, offi cials could not detect problems prior
to fl ight tests. The schedule also left insuffi cient
time for prefl ight testing, post-fl ight analysis, and
corrective action.
• The requirement to be able to quickly deploy an
early prototype system diverted the contractor
and government project management’s attention
away from the normal interceptor development
process and resulted in interceptors that were not
equipped with suffi cient instruments to provide
optimum test data.
• Quality assurance received insuffi cient emphasis
and resources during the time of component production,
resulting in unreliable components.
• The contract for developing the interceptor was a
cost-plus-fi xed-fee contract, a contract type that
placed all of the program’s fi nancial risk on the
government and did not include provisions that
542 CHAPTER 12 / PROJECT AUDITING
could be used to hold the contractor accountable
for less than optimum performance.