Organizational behavior case for di

Organizational behavior case for discussion
Acting on a vision of change
Video-game maker Activision was founded in 1979 by an ex-music industry executive and four disgruntled programmers from Atari,a pioneer in arcade game and home video=game consoles. In part, the company was established as a haven for game developers unhappy with prevailing industry policy at the end of the 1970s. At the time, systems providers like Atari hired developers to create game only for their own systems; in-house developers were paid straight salaries and denied credit for individual contributions, and there was no channel at all for would-de independents. Positioning itself as the industry’s first third-party developer, Activision began promoting creators as well as games. It went public in 1983 and successfully rode the crest of a booming market until the mid-1980s.
Its struggles began in 1986, when it entered an ill advised merger with Infocom, a software firm founded to develop interactive-fiction games. The relationship was rocky from the first, and Activision closed down Infocom operations in 1989, after three years of mismanagement and escalating losses. Meanwhile, Activision had also begun to branch out from video games into other types of software and, in order to underscore its new commitment to a broader product line, changed its name to Mediagenic. By this time, however, competition in the video-game market had increased substantially, and the decision turned into arcas beyond its distinctive competence turned out to be a major strategic blunder. By 1991, Mediagenic was bankrupt.
This is the point at which Robert Kotick happened upon Activision/Mediagenic-“a company,” as Forbes magazine put it, “with a sorry balance sheet but a storied history.” Kotick, a serial entrepreneur with no particular passion for video games, bought one-third of the firm for $440,000 and looked immediately to industry leader Electronic Arts (EA) for a survey of best practices in the industry. What he discovered, however, was a competitor whose culture was beset by internal conflict-namely,between managers motivated by productivity and profit and developers driven by independence and imagination. But EA also sold a lot of video games, and to Kotick, the basic tension in EA culture was not entirely surprising:clearly the business of making and marketing video games succeeded when the creative side of the enterprise was supported by financing and distribution muscle, but it was equally true that a steady stream of successful games came from a company’s creative people. The key to getting Activision/Mediagenic back in the game, Kotick decided, was managing this complex of essential resources better than his competition-notably EA-did.
So the next year, Kotick raised $40 million through a stock offering, moved the company (rechristened Activision) from Silicon Valley to Los Angeles, and began to recruit the people who could furnish the resources that he needed most-creative expertise and a share of the passion that its customers brought to the video-game industry. Activision, he promised prospective developers, would not manage its human resources the way that EA did: he argued, “has commoditized development. We won’t absorb you into a big Death Star culture.”
Between 1997 and 2003, Kotick proceeded to buy no fewer than nine studios, but his concept of a video game studio system was quite different from that of EA, which was determined to make production more efficient by centralizing groups of designers and programmers into regional offices. Kotick allowed his studios keep their own names, often let them stay where they were, and further encouraged autonomy by providing seed money for Activision alumni who wanted to launch out on their own. He still conducts market research out of the company’s L.A headquarters but does not use the results to put pressure on his creative teams; rather, he shares the data with his studios and lets them draw their own conclusions. Each studio issues its own financial statements and draws on its own bonus pool, and the paychecks of studio heads reflect both company-wide profits and losses.

ผลลัพธ์ (ไทย) 1:

กรณีศึกษาองค์การสำหรับสนทนาดำเนินการในวิสัยทัศน์ของการเปลี่ยนแปลงเครื่องวิดีโอเกม Activision ก่อตั้งขึ้นในปีค.ศ. 1979 โดยผู้บริหารอุตสาหกรรมเพลงอดีตและโปรแกรมเมอร์ disgruntled สี่จากอาตาริ ผู้บุกเบิกในเกมส์และวิดีโอจากทางบ้าน =เกมคอนโซล ในส่วน บริษัทก่อตั้งเป็นสถานที่สำหรับนักพัฒนาเกมที่ไม่มีความสุขกับนโยบายอุตสาหกรรมเป็นที่สิ้นสุดของทศวรรษ 1970 เวลา ผู้ให้บริการระบบชอบอาตาริที่จ้างนักพัฒนาสร้างเกมสำหรับระบบของตัวเอง นักพัฒนาในบ้านจ่ายตรงเงินเดือน และถูกปฏิเสธสินเชื่อสำหรับแต่ละผลงาน และมีช่องไม่เลยสำหรับ independents เดอจะ วางตำแหน่งตัวเองเป็นอุตสาหกรรมแรกของบุคคลที่สามพัฒนา Activision ที่เริ่มส่งเสริมผู้สร้างเป็นเกม มันไปสาธารณะในปี 1983 และเรียบร้อยขี่ยอดตลาดเฟื่องฟูจนถึงกลางไฟต์Its struggles began in 1986, when it entered an ill advised merger with Infocom, a software firm founded to develop interactive-fiction games. The relationship was rocky from the first, and Activision closed down Infocom operations in 1989, after three years of mismanagement and escalating losses. Meanwhile, Activision had also begun to branch out from video games into other types of software and, in order to underscore its new commitment to a broader product line, changed its name to Mediagenic. By this time, however, competition in the video-game market had increased substantially, and the decision turned into arcas beyond its distinctive competence turned out to be a major strategic blunder. By 1991, Mediagenic was bankrupt.This is the point at which Robert Kotick happened upon Activision/Mediagenic-“a company,” as Forbes magazine put it, “with a sorry balance sheet but a storied history.” Kotick, a serial entrepreneur with no particular passion for video games, bought one-third of the firm for $440,000 and looked immediately to industry leader Electronic Arts (EA) for a survey of best practices in the industry. What he discovered, however, was a competitor whose culture was beset by internal conflict-namely,between managers motivated by productivity and profit and developers driven by independence and imagination. But EA also sold a lot of video games, and to Kotick, the basic tension in EA culture was not entirely surprising:clearly the business of making and marketing video games succeeded when the creative side of the enterprise was supported by financing and distribution muscle, but it was equally true that a steady stream of successful games came from a company’s creative people. The key to getting Activision/Mediagenic back in the game, Kotick decided, was managing this complex of essential resources better than his competition-notably EA-did.So the next year, Kotick raised $40 million through a stock offering, moved the company (rechristened Activision) from Silicon Valley to Los Angeles, and began to recruit the people who could furnish the resources that he needed most-creative expertise and a share of the passion that its customers brought to the video-game industry. Activision, he promised prospective developers, would not manage its human resources the way that EA did: he argued, “has commoditized development. We won’t absorb you into a big Death Star culture.”Between 1997 and 2003, Kotick proceeded to buy no fewer than nine studios, but his concept of a video game studio system was quite different from that of EA, which was determined to make production more efficient by centralizing groups of designers and programmers into regional offices. Kotick allowed his studios keep their own names, often let them stay where they were, and further encouraged autonomy by providing seed money for Activision alumni who wanted to launch out on their own. He still conducts market research out of the company’s L.A headquarters but does not use the results to put pressure on his creative teams; rather, he shares the data with his studios and lets them draw their own conclusions. Each studio issues its own financial statements and draws on its own bonus pool, and the paychecks of studio heads reflect both company-wide profits and losses.

ผลลัพธ์ (ไทย) 3:

กรณีพฤติกรรมขององค์การ เพื่ออภิปราย
ทำวิสัยทัศน์ของการเปลี่ยนแปลง
วิดีโอเกม Activision ได้ก่อตั้งขึ้นในปี 1979 โดยอดีตผู้บริหารอุตสาหกรรมดนตรีและสี่โปรแกรมเมอร์ไม่พอใจจาก Atari , ผู้บุกเบิกในเกมอาเขตและโฮมวิดีโอ = เกมคอนโซล ในส่วนของ บริษัท ได้ก่อตั้งขึ้นเป็นสวรรค์สำหรับนักพัฒนาเกมไม่มีความสุขกับอุตสาหกรรมแลกเปลี่ยนนโยบายในตอนท้ายของทศวรรษ ที่เวลาผู้ให้บริการระบบเช่น Atari จ้างนักพัฒนาสร้างเกมสำหรับระบบของพวกเขาเอง นักพัฒนาระบบจ่ายตรงเงินเดือนและการปฏิเสธสินเชื่อสำหรับผลงานของแต่ละบุคคลและไม่มีช่องทางที่จะเดอ อิสระ . การวางตำแหน่งตัวเองเป็นนักพัฒนาบุคคลที่สามตัวแรกของอุตสาหกรรม , Activision เริ่มส่งเสริมผู้สร้างเช่นเดียวกับเกมไปสาธารณะในปี 1983 และได้ขี่ยอดของตลาดเฟื่องฟูจนถึงช่วงกลางทศวรรษที่ 1980 - .
ของการต่อสู้เริ่มต้นในปี 1986 เมื่อป้อนป่วยควรดาวน์โหลดซอฟต์แวร์การควบรวมกิจการกับ , บริษัทก่อตั้งขึ้นเพื่อพัฒนาเกมแบบโต้ตอบเรื่องอ่านเล่น ความสัมพันธ์เป็นหินจากครั้งแรกและ Activision ปิดการดาวน์โหลดในปี 1989 หลังจากสามปีของการจัดการไม่ดีและเพิ่มความเสียหาย