The idea of ‘saving the appearances’ as the object of science was adopted by Pierre
Duhem (1861–1916), the physicist, philosopher of science, and historian of science. Duhem’s
argument for this thesis continues to be significant, partly through its influence on
W.V. O. Quine, the most influential American philosopher of the second half of the
twentieth century. Duhem’s position differed from that of current neo-Aristotelians; while
himself espousing an Aristotelian metaphysics, he thought that science was in practice
unable to arrive at knowledge of the essences of things, and that it was not its function to
do so (see Duhem 1987, pp. 90–91). Current neo-Aristotelians espouse scientific realism (a
view characteristic of Australian and New Zealand philosophers, who make up a large part
of the most significant advocates of this view), and assert that an Aristotelian metaphysics
is preferable precisely on the grounds of its suitability as an analysis of scientific theory
and practice.