This finding holds regardless of whether one or multiple copies of the file exist. London-Sire, like all of the P2P cases, obviously concerned multiple copies of one digital music file. But that distinction is immaterial under the plain language of the Copyright Act. Simply put, it is the creationof a new material object and not anadditional material object that defines the reproduction right. The dictionary defines “reproduction” to mean, inter alia, “to produce again” or “to cause to exist again or a new.” See Merriam-Webster Collegiate Edition 994 (10th ed. 1998) (emphasis added). Significantly, it is not defined as “to produce again while the original exists.” Thus, the right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in . . . phonorecords” is implicated whenever a sound recording is fixed in a new material object, regardless ofwhether the sound recording remains fixed in the original material object.