The situation was, however, much more complicated. Many of the Thajsin’s government policies, both populist or otherwise, have been carried out through non-budgetary means, so they do not show up in the traditional budgetary or public debt measures. If one only pays attention to the normal budget and public debt figures, it would be like looking at foreign reserves only in relation to the number of months of imports like before the crisis. This would be dangerous. There are many reasons why one needs to look beyond the regular budget and public debt figures.
First, the cycle of grassroots and SME expanded lending and debt forgiveness as discussed above is likely to create substantial contingent liability for the government eventually. This has not been factored into the official public debt figures. In addition, in developing various mass-transit projects, promises have been made to the public that fares will be very low; for example, only 15 baht ($US 0.40) per journey. It is most likely that if this were really the case, a substantial subsidy will be required to keep the system going once built. These subsidies again do not appear anywhere in the projected public debt.
There were also cases of creative financing, or creative accounting depending on how one looks at it. Some major investment projects were done through securitization and the use of special purpose vehicles (SPV) in a way that committed future liabilities did not show up as public debt. A good example is a project to develop a new government administrative center in the north of Bangkok. An SPV was set up with nominal paid-up capital, which is more than 50% privately owned so that it was not a state enterprise. The SPV issued bonds to raise money to construct and develop the administrative center. These bonds were backed by a long-term lease given to a government department with guaranteed rental. These rental payment ( stretching to more than 30 years ) clearly were committed liabilities of the government, yet they were not included in the public debt figures.
The above indicates that one needs to be very careful in judging the fiscal or quasi-fiscal position of the country. The way many policies were carried out under the Thaksin government tends to hide the true future liabilities of the government. If true lessons have been learned from the crisis, this should not have happened. The best approach is to be very transparent about what is happening, what are the commitments and what are the risks. If government policies are shrouded by obscurity, there is a clear danger that before the risks to economic stability can be clearly seen, the problems might have already become too big to be easily handled.
The situation was, however, much more complicated. Many of the Thajsin’s government policies, both populist or otherwise, have been carried out through non-budgetary means, so they do not show up in the traditional budgetary or public debt measures. If one only pays attention to the normal budget and public debt figures, it would be like looking at foreign reserves only in relation to the number of months of imports like before the crisis. This would be dangerous. There are many reasons why one needs to look beyond the regular budget and public debt figures.First, the cycle of grassroots and SME expanded lending and debt forgiveness as discussed above is likely to create substantial contingent liability for the government eventually. This has not been factored into the official public debt figures. In addition, in developing various mass-transit projects, promises have been made to the public that fares will be very low; for example, only 15 baht ($US 0.40) per journey. It is most likely that if this were really the case, a substantial subsidy will be required to keep the system going once built. These subsidies again do not appear anywhere in the projected public debt.There were also cases of creative financing, or creative accounting depending on how one looks at it. Some major investment projects were done through securitization and the use of special purpose vehicles (SPV) in a way that committed future liabilities did not show up as public debt. A good example is a project to develop a new government administrative center in the north of Bangkok. An SPV was set up with nominal paid-up capital, which is more than 50% privately owned so that it was not a state enterprise. The SPV issued bonds to raise money to construct and develop the administrative center. These bonds were backed by a long-term lease given to a government department with guaranteed rental. These rental payment ( stretching to more than 30 years ) clearly were committed liabilities of the government, yet they were not included in the public debt figures.The above indicates that one needs to be very careful in judging the fiscal or quasi-fiscal position of the country. The way many policies were carried out under the Thaksin government tends to hide the true future liabilities of the government. If true lessons have been learned from the crisis, this should not have happened. The best approach is to be very transparent about what is happening, what are the commitments and what are the risks. If government policies are shrouded by obscurity, there is a clear danger that before the risks to economic stability can be clearly seen, the problems might have already become too big to be easily handled.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..

The situation was, however, much more complicated. Many of the Thajsin’s government policies, both populist or otherwise, have been carried out through non-budgetary means, so they do not show up in the traditional budgetary or public debt measures. If one only pays attention to the normal budget and public debt figures, it would be like looking at foreign reserves only in relation to the number of months of imports like before the crisis. This would be dangerous. There are many reasons why one needs to look beyond the regular budget and public debt figures.
First, the cycle of grassroots and SME expanded lending and debt forgiveness as discussed above is likely to create substantial contingent liability for the government eventually. This has not been factored into the official public debt figures. In addition, in developing various mass-transit projects, promises have been made to the public that fares will be very low; for example, only 15 baht ($US 0.40) per journey. It is most likely that if this were really the case, a substantial subsidy will be required to keep the system going once built. These subsidies again do not appear anywhere in the projected public debt.
There were also cases of creative financing, or creative accounting depending on how one looks at it. Some major investment projects were done through securitization and the use of special purpose vehicles (SPV) in a way that committed future liabilities did not show up as public debt. A good example is a project to develop a new government administrative center in the north of Bangkok. An SPV was set up with nominal paid-up capital, which is more than 50% privately owned so that it was not a state enterprise. The SPV issued bonds to raise money to construct and develop the administrative center. These bonds were backed by a long-term lease given to a government department with guaranteed rental. These rental payment ( stretching to more than 30 years ) clearly were committed liabilities of the government, yet they were not included in the public debt figures.
The above indicates that one needs to be very careful in judging the fiscal or quasi-fiscal position of the country. The way many policies were carried out under the Thaksin government tends to hide the true future liabilities of the government. If true lessons have been learned from the crisis, this should not have happened. The best approach is to be very transparent about what is happening, what are the commitments and what are the risks. If government policies are shrouded by obscurity, there is a clear danger that before the risks to economic stability can be clearly seen, the problems might have already become too big to be easily handled.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
