idea, mentioned in chapter 1, of taking other beings‘ interests as one‘s own. I shall appeal
to Śāntideva to show how this might be grounded, not on any ideas about sameness or
difference, but rather on a realization of emptiness, which, it is said, gives rise to
compassion, and causes the bodhisattva to remain in saṃsāra for the sake of other beings
(BCA 9:52).
I shall go on to ask whether the practice of identification, understood as extending
love and compassion to all sentient beings, can be used to support an environmentally
sound version of Mahāyāna Buddhism. In chapter 1, it was said that the problem of early
Buddhism‘s negative evaluation of the natural world—the description of it as pervaded
with suffering—could be resolved by taking solicitude as a subjective way of valuing
nature intrinsically. In brief, one could simply decide to value nature and natural beings
for their own sake, regardless of whether or not they ‗possessed‘ intrinsic value
objectively.
Finally, I shall take up once more the issues that we raised in chapter 1 concerning
these themes and explore whether a specifically Mahāyāna understanding could solve the
difficulties encountered. These included the problem that extending love and compassion
universally cannot serve as a method for deciding against competing interests, and neither
can it provide an ecologically sensitive approach. A second complaint was that suffering
is a natural and intrinsic part of ecological relations, and therefore, to the extent that
bodhisattvas aim at eliminating it altogether, their actions are unnatural and unecological.
Lastly, we will also need to consider the possibility of applying solicitude to non-sentient
and non-living beings, such as species, ecosystems, trees, and rocks, which are also
objects of concern for the environmentalist.
Identification and Solicitude
Apart from theories about oneness and internal relations, what is held in common by all
deep ecologists, according to Naess, is a way of experiencing nature ―through which the
interest or interests of another being are reacted to as our own interest or interests‖ (Naess
1995, 258–261). Warwick Fox describes this ―central intuition of deep ecology‖ as a
form of consciousness that does not perceive boundaries between oneself and other
idea, mentioned in chapter 1, of taking other beings‘ interests as one‘s own. I shall appeal
to Śāntideva to show how this might be grounded, not on any ideas about sameness or
difference, but rather on a realization of emptiness, which, it is said, gives rise to
compassion, and causes the bodhisattva to remain in saṃsāra for the sake of other beings
(BCA 9:52).
I shall go on to ask whether the practice of identification, understood as extending
love and compassion to all sentient beings, can be used to support an environmentally
sound version of Mahāyāna Buddhism. In chapter 1, it was said that the problem of early
Buddhism‘s negative evaluation of the natural world—the description of it as pervaded
with suffering—could be resolved by taking solicitude as a subjective way of valuing
nature intrinsically. In brief, one could simply decide to value nature and natural beings
for their own sake, regardless of whether or not they ‗possessed‘ intrinsic value
objectively.
Finally, I shall take up once more the issues that we raised in chapter 1 concerning
these themes and explore whether a specifically Mahāyāna understanding could solve the
difficulties encountered. These included the problem that extending love and compassion
universally cannot serve as a method for deciding against competing interests, and neither
can it provide an ecologically sensitive approach. A second complaint was that suffering
is a natural and intrinsic part of ecological relations, and therefore, to the extent that
bodhisattvas aim at eliminating it altogether, their actions are unnatural and unecological.
Lastly, we will also need to consider the possibility of applying solicitude to non-sentient
and non-living beings, such as species, ecosystems, trees, and rocks, which are also
objects of concern for the environmentalist.
Identification and Solicitude
Apart from theories about oneness and internal relations, what is held in common by all
deep ecologists, according to Naess, is a way of experiencing nature ―through which the
interest or interests of another being are reacted to as our own interest or interests‖ (Naess
1995, 258–261). Warwick Fox describes this ―central intuition of deep ecology‖ as a
form of consciousness that does not perceive boundaries between oneself and other
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