7.THE ROUTE TO COMPREHENSIVE MONETARY EASING (CME)
Japan has experienced economic stagnation since the early 1990s, but the legacy
of the burst economic bubble from the start of the 1990s—the three excesses described previously—were resolved in the early 2000s (see Figure 2). However,
the economic slump continued, exacerbated by the global financial crisis. The cautious prospects for inflation have persisted, dampening economic activity.
As a result of the global financial crisis of 2008, Japan suffered a huge negative shock. This reflected a huge reduction in exports caused by reduced global demand rather than a contagion in the financial sector. Since domestic demand in Japan became fragile after the bursting of the bubble economy, the Japanese economy has grown more dependent on external demand. An expansion in global demand boosted the Japanese economy in 2003 and 2004. But a rapid shrinking in global demand significantly weakened the economy in 2008.
Although the BOJ immediately cut interest rates in response to the rapid economic downturn, it did not rapidly implement unconventional measures. It recognized that the Japanese financial system had maintained relative soundness since it did not hold toxic assets, unlike banks in the United States and Europe. Moreover, it saw that ample liquidity remained in the market. Thus, it was judged that emergency measures were not needed to boost market liquidity.
In fact, in the latter stage of the QEP, underbidding of securities purchase by the BOJ occurred quite frequently. This reflected a decline in precautionary demand for liquidity by banks, since the financial system had regained its stability. The BOJ was criticized for its reluctance to conduct monetary easing, as it could not achieve the target of current account balances in the final stage of the QEP. However, a decline in the current account balances reflected decreasing demand, not a tightening in supply. The BOJ received additional misdirected criticism when other major central banks adopted aggressive unconventional measures following the global financial crisis in 2008.
After the global financial crisis, the main factor behind the economy’s renewed sluggishness was the yen’s appreciation. The yen appreciated at a rapid pace against the U.S. dollar and the euro. There are two explanations for this. The first focuses on the difference in monetary expansion, in particular, the monetary base (Figure 7). Since the United States and Europe started quantitative easing while Japan did not, the growth of the monetary base in Japan became much smaller than those in the United States and Europe; as a simple monetary approach would suggest, this led to a rise in the yen. The second explanation focuses on the situation regarding risk. According to this view, the yen was bought as a safe currency. Empirical studies show that rising risks in the U.S. market—measured in terms of the VIX—lead to the yen’s appreciation. According to this explanation, the yen would have appreciated even if the BOJ had started much
earlier to increase the monetary base.