a b s t r a c t
This paperexamineswhyCFOsbecomeinvolvedinmaterialaccountingmanipulations.
We findthatwhileCFOsbearsubstantiallegalcostswheninvolvedinaccounting
manipulations,theseCFOshavesimilarequityincentivestotheCFOsofmatchednon-
manipulationfirms.Incontrast,CEOsofmanipulationfirmshavehigherequity
incentivesandmorepowerthanCEOsofmatchedfirms.Takentogether,ourfindings
are consistentwiththeexplanationthatCFOsareinvolvedinmaterialaccounting
manipulationsbecausetheysuccumbtopressurefromCEOs,ratherthanbecausethey
seek immediatepersonalfinancialbenefitfromtheirequityincentives.AAERcontent
analysisreinforcesthisconclusion.
& 2010ElsevierB.V.Allrightsreserved.
1. Introduction
Recent corporateaccountingscandalshaveledtosignificantlossesforinvestors,triggeredaseriesofcorporate
governance reformsandlegislativechanges,andpromptedeffortstoidentifytheunderlyingcausesofthesescandals.Prior
research hasfocusedontheincentivesofCEOsortheexecutiveteamasawholetomanipulateaccountingearnings