5.THE QUANTITATIVE EASING POLICY (QEP)
Unfortunately, in the fall of 2000—shortly after the BOJ had exited the ZIRP—the IT bubble burst in the United States. Interest rates in Japan remained low against the background of low growth and a low inflation rate. Thus, in addition to the negative shock of Japan’s banking crisis in 1997, the economy suffered another negative shock, which caused banks to face the zero interest bound once more. At the time, this situation was considered to be unique to Japan, but it has since become a common one for central banks in other developed economies.
In 2001, the BOJ adopted the quantitative easing policy (QEP) (Figure 5). The QEP was achieved by creating excess reserves with ample liquidity provided by the central bank, which contributed to financial system stability. The announcement of time duration was also adopted. The ZIRP and the QEP thus shared two characteristics, of creating excess reserves and announcing the time duration of policy. The main difference was the policy target: the ZIRP targeted the zero interest rate as the policy rate, while the QEP did not necessarily target the zero interest rate. Theoretically, under the QEP regime, the interest rate could have reached a positive number. This allowed the charging of risk premiums on banks that held risks. Accordingly, compared to the ZIRP, the QEP can be said to have respected the market mechanism.
In fact, however, due to the provision of ample liquidity, interest rates remained
at zero and transactions in the money market slumped (Figure 6). As the BOJ extended its zero cost credit to banks that held eligible collateral, a risk premium on borrowing failed to appear in the money market.
The QEP has been described as the balance-sheet policy of a central bank.
Chairman Ben S. Bernanke of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board has given a detailed
definition of this.11
He differentiated from the QEP the policy of increasing current
account balances on the liability side of a central bank’s balance sheet, and referred to the policy in which a central bank expanded its assets by purchasing risk assets as
“credit easing.” The Fed subsequently bought a massive amount of mortgage-backed
securities. The Fed’s balance-sheet policy was called large-scale asset purchase
(LASP), indicating a difference in policy from the QEP. During the QEP period of the
BOJ, several measures of credit easing were implemented; the BOJ bought risky assets such asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). However, since the capital market was relatively small compared to bank loans, there was a natural limit for credit easing in Japan.
The policy target for the BOJ’s QEP became the outstanding balance of current
accounts. In the five years from March 2001 to March 2006, the BOJ raised this target eight times, from 5 trillion yen to 30–35 trillion yen. The target was changed so as to be discretionary. It is extremely difficult to find a policy rule such as the Taylor rule for the QEP. The BOJ raised the target to respond to events such as the release of disappointing economic news and changes in economic conditions such as those
triggered by yen appreciation.
It is worthwhile here to consider the relationship between the QEP and exchange
rate policy. The Japanese government intervened heavily in the foreign exchange
market in 2003 and 2004. For a fiscal authority, when fiscal policies are ineffective and the fiscal position is deteriorating, depreciation of the exchange rate is the only
remaining tool. Intervention was supported by the BOJ’s QEP. The BOJ did not
comment on the use of monetary policy to support intervention. Nevertheless, a
consequence was that even though the BOJ provided credit independently, it was
unsterilized.
The time duration policy triggered the so-called carry trade, which had the
played a more important role than intervention in bringing about a depreciation in the
exchange rate.12 From approximately 2004 to 2006, there was massive speculation
focused on the purchase of high-yield currencies financed in yen at low interest rates.
The situation contradicted the academic convention that currencies of high interest rate economies must depreciate.13
Financial stability was maintained under the QEP. Japan announced that it would
resume payoff of insured depositors and the banking crisis was finally brought to a
conclusion. The BOJ recognized that unconventional policies were ineffective in
promoting real economic recovery when significant structural problems existed,
but that the policies could be highly effective in restoring financial stability.
A recovery in Japan became evident around 2004, supported by global recovery.
A housing boom, supported by low interest rates, took place in the United States. Emerging economies such as the BRICs also showed high growth. In addition to such external factors, the recovery was supported by the cheap yen. Thus,
the excesses that had plagued economy were finally resolved.
An important change also occurred in the global economy. China had been regarded as an exporter of deflation due to the expansion in its low-priced exports. But as emerging economies led by China continued to enjoy an economic boom, global inflation emerged as seen, for example, in rising commodity prices. The BOJ made the commitment that it would continue the QEP until consumer price index (CPI) inflation become positive in a stable manner. A moderate rise in prices became evident, together with a gradual recovery.