The negative correlations between the stock market and foreign exchange market during the period before the Asian crisis is related to the Asian miracle. The world capital markets over invested in the Asian economies. This investment boom represented a significant positive shock to these economies, contributing to asset price increases, especially in the stock market. Corsetti et al. (1999) conclude that, despite the liberalization of internal and external financial control in the 1990s that triggered this boom, most of the Asian economies pursued a policy of an effective peg to the U.S. dollar in order to facilitate and maintain external financing of domestic investments. The peg reduced the currency risk premium charged by international investors. When the U.S. dollar strengthened, the value of the Asian currencies per U.S. dollar soared in 1996. This domestic currency appreciation eroded competitiveness in the traded-goods sector causing a shift in the composition of capital inflows from foreign direct investment to more liquid portfolio investment. The financial institutions in Asia were not capable in intermediating this increased capital inflow into productive capacity, but the capital inflow rather exacerbated the underlying structural weaknesses of domestic financial systems. Such a system is fragile and vulnerable to real and financial shocks.