Like other states, Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy is an end product of its
peculiar strategic priorities Although the country’s military and civilian
authorities are conscious of the pressure the international community is
putting on Pakistan to fight terrorism, top officials still are not yet convinced
of the seriousness of the Obama administration to combat area militants.
President Obama’s announcement of a withdrawal beginning in July 2011 is
interpreted as Washington losing its will and its intent to keep fighting. There
are many in the strategic community in Pakistan who believe that the fight
against terrorism will eventually be outsourced to the Pakistani military. Under
such circumstances, Pakistan would have to continue investing in the Taliban,
especially to counter India’s growing social and political influence in Kabul. The
link with the Taliban and other local militant groups, as has been argued here, is
in part the result of Pakistan’s traditional insecurity concerning India. Although
militancy hurts Pakistan, there is an unwillingness to abandon it as a policy tool.
Using militants as part of a proxy war is a concept well integrated into Pakistan’s
military strategy.2