Clearly, the U.S. has shown its desire to become more assertive in its relations with Thailand.
In January 2015, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel visited Thailand and
met with Foreign Minister General Thanasak Patimaprakorn, as well as former Prime Ministers
Yingluck and Abhisit. His tour of Thailand was mired in controversy after he urged the
military government to lift martial law and to quickly return power to the Thai people. His
remarks also came in the aftermath of Yingluck being impeached in connection with accusations
that she had mishandled a rice-pledging scheme. Observers believed that the United
States wanted to send a strong message of disapproval of the military government, its slow
political reform and its harassment of the opposition. Immediately, Russel’s comments were
harshly responded to by the junta. Prayuth decried Russel’s actions as interference in Thai
domestic affairs (Parameswaran 2015). Meanwhile, ultra-nationalists expressed their anger
against the United States; they stormed the Facebook pages of the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok
and of President Barack Obama, sending repeated messages that Thailand was an independent
country and would not take orders from the U.S.. At the same time, the Thai Committee
of Foreign Affairs, under the Thai Parliament, summoned the Chargé d'Affaires Patrick
Murphy even when it had no right to do so. The Thai reaction caused great concern in
Washington. In return, the State Department summoned the Thai ambassador to Washington,
warning that the drama could have a huge impact on bilateral relations.9
The current U.S. position regarding the Thai situation has deeply infuriated the leaders in
Bangkok. They were astounded by the seemingly fluctuating policy of the U.S. government,
which had previously been openly supportive of the traditional elite. Throughout the Cold
War, the U.S. had forged a close alliance with key institutions in Thailand but this alliance
has weakened in recent years. The United States realized that there were new players entering
the Thai political domain who did not align themselves with the traditional elite.
Therefore, it saw the need to diversify its policy options and reach out to the Red Shirts faction
as part of its obligation to promote democracy, but more importantly to ensure that it
did not put “all its eggs in one basket.” This was evident in the fact that U.S. diplomats have
visited the remote regions of Thailand aligned with the Red Shirts in more frequently.
Again, I argue that the United States has adopted an “interventionist approach” in order to
manipulate the Thai political situation to its own advantages; and in doing so has befriended
and irritated in equal measure both sides in Thailand’s conflict.
China’s strategy has been cautious and very diplomatic. Thailand and China established
diplomatic ties in 1975. Throughout the latter half of the Cold War, Thailand and China
formed a loose military alignment against the advancement of Vietnamese communists in
Indochina (Paribatra 1987: 18-19). After the end of the Cold War, bilateral relations remained
healthy thanks to the absence of territorial disputes, the firm ties between the Thai
royal family and the Chinese leadership, and the well-integrated Chinese community in
Thailand. Thaksin, a model of a successful Thai-Chinese, took advantage of his Chinese ancestral
roots and a new surge in public awareness about China to craft a favorable China
policy to satisfy domestic enthusiasm for a closer relationship with Beijing. A 2006 poll
showed that more than 70 percent of Thais considered China to be Thailand’s most important
external influence (Kurlantzick 2006: 1). The Sino-Thai FTA, the first between China
and an ASEAN country, took effect on 1 October 2003. The FTA was invented to slash tariffs