5. Achieving leverage effects with the EU-budget
Achieving leverage with the EU budget is in effect the easiest and most promising path to put the European Investment Bank to a better use.
The basic mechanism is to use a part of the EU-budget as a risk buffer. Thereby EIB-loans for projects become less risky, which permits either higher volumes or lower interest rates, sometimes facilitating otherwise impossible financing. The leverage effect with the most mature product (innovation) was projected to be five, thereby having one billion Euros from the EU-budget facilitating 5 billion Euro of credit in innovation. De facto, a factor of six was realized via the EIB, actually a bit better than planned. As losses were considerably below prudent forecasts, most of the one billion Euro were not used, but instead returned to the EU-budget.
Thus, in this area empirically verifiable experiences exist. Examples are in the financing of innovation (RSSF) and in regional financing (JESSICA, JEREMIE) EIB schemes. The recently signed initiative for SME’s in Greece is likewise similar. The planned EU-project bonds, which do not represent EU- borrowing, but instead expand EIB-activities, also veer in this direction.
6. EU-project bonds and the EIB
According to the project bonds proposal, large projects could be co-financed by the EIB alongside with private capital from pension funds and insurance companies that currently do not fund large investment projects, due to too high risks. Before the financial crisis, these risks were absorbed by large mono-line insurers (such as AIG), with the help of which the financing of such projects were transformed into triple-A bonds. After the crisis, this insurance is no longer available.
The project-bonds would work in similar ways. Private investors would advance 25% in equity. The EIB would finance the next 25% as mezzanine tranches. The final 50% (senior tranches) would hope- fully reach a rating of BBB+ or A-, thereby becoming an allowed investment class for pension funds and insurance companies. Regarding the mezzanine tranche, the EU would absorb half of the risk using the risk buffer, which is liable for first losses.
The EIB remains a part of financing for the entire time of the project, thereby adding an additional element of quality for the insurers and pension funds.
The risk of financing for the EIB is thereby reduced- compared to the risk if the EIB were to do it all on its own. If the EIB receives this risk buffer, it can lend up to four times the amount of low-risk loans as compared to independently realized projects.
If one wanted to reach, for example, a loan volume of €160 billion in four years, and € 40 billion per year, this corresponds to additional EIB financing activity of €10 billion per year, and €40 billion for the four year period. To finance the €40 billion from the EIB (25% of 160 billion) for four years, €20 billion from EU-budgets for the risk buffer, and €5 billion yearly, are needed.
5. Achieving leverage effects with the EU-budgetAchieving leverage with the EU budget is in effect the easiest and most promising path to put the European Investment Bank to a better use.The basic mechanism is to use a part of the EU-budget as a risk buffer. Thereby EIB-loans for projects become less risky, which permits either higher volumes or lower interest rates, sometimes facilitating otherwise impossible financing. The leverage effect with the most mature product (innovation) was projected to be five, thereby having one billion Euros from the EU-budget facilitating 5 billion Euro of credit in innovation. De facto, a factor of six was realized via the EIB, actually a bit better than planned. As losses were considerably below prudent forecasts, most of the one billion Euro were not used, but instead returned to the EU-budget.Thus, in this area empirically verifiable experiences exist. Examples are in the financing of innovation (RSSF) and in regional financing (JESSICA, JEREMIE) EIB schemes. The recently signed initiative for SME’s in Greece is likewise similar. The planned EU-project bonds, which do not represent EU- borrowing, but instead expand EIB-activities, also veer in this direction.6. EU-project bonds and the EIBAccording to the project bonds proposal, large projects could be co-financed by the EIB alongside with private capital from pension funds and insurance companies that currently do not fund large investment projects, due to too high risks. Before the financial crisis, these risks were absorbed by large mono-line insurers (such as AIG), with the help of which the financing of such projects were transformed into triple-A bonds. After the crisis, this insurance is no longer available.The project-bonds would work in similar ways. Private investors would advance 25% in equity. The EIB would finance the next 25% as mezzanine tranches. The final 50% (senior tranches) would hope- fully reach a rating of BBB+ or A-, thereby becoming an allowed investment class for pension funds and insurance companies. Regarding the mezzanine tranche, the EU would absorb half of the risk using the risk buffer, which is liable for first losses.The EIB remains a part of financing for the entire time of the project, thereby adding an additional element of quality for the insurers and pension funds.The risk of financing for the EIB is thereby reduced- compared to the risk if the EIB were to do it all on its own. If the EIB receives this risk buffer, it can lend up to four times the amount of low-risk loans as compared to independently realized projects.If one wanted to reach, for example, a loan volume of €160 billion in four years, and € 40 billion per year, this corresponds to additional EIB financing activity of €10 billion per year, and €40 billion for the four year period. To finance the €40 billion from the EIB (25% of 160 billion) for four years, €20 billion from EU-budgets for the risk buffer, and €5 billion yearly, are needed.
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