Specifically, we aim to answer the following questions. First, do accounting onservatism policies affect trade credit financing? The literature on trade credit is currently based mainly on the theories of alternative financing and market power. From the perspective of demand, the theory of alternative financing holds that credit rationing prevents some companies from obtaining sufficient bank lending. They therefore turn to trade
credit financing, despite having to bear the higher costs of trade credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Biais and Gollier, 1997). From the supply perspective, market power theory considers that due to market power, suppliers (customers) will take the initiative to provide a large amount of low-cost trade credit to a company to promote sales (supplies) (Summers and Wilson, 1999; Fisman and Raturi, 2004; Van Horen, 2005). Regardless of what theory applies, a company seeking trade credit needs to sign a debt contract with a supplier or a customer. Hui et al. (2012) argue that as accounting conservatism can recognize losses in a timely fashion, it can protect the interests of customers and suppliers when signing contracts and reduce potential losses from such
transactions. We therefore examine whether companies with higher accounting onservatism obtain more trade credit.