7. ConclusionOur approachinthisrevi

7. Conclusion
Our approachinthisreviewistodefineearningsqualitybroadlytobedecisionusefulness—in anydecisionbyany
decision maker.Thusthenumberofrelevantarticlesisover300,andbynecessityourdiscussionisbroad.
We emphasizetwosignificantconclusionsbasedonoursurveyoftheearningsqualityliteratureasawhole.First,
because alloftheproxiesforearningsqualitythatinvolveearnings(i.e.,propertiessuchaspersistence,timelyloss
recognition, smoothness,andsmallprofits,aswellastheERCs)haveattheircorethereportedaccrual-basedearnings
number, theseproxiesareaffectedbothbythefirm’sfundamentalperformanceandbythemeasurementofperformance.
Future researchcouldmoreclearlyrecognizethedistinctionbetweenperformanceandperformancemeasurementwhen
making predictionsandevaluatingresults.Thiswouldhelpusasaprofessiontodeterminethecontributionofthe
accounting measurementsystemtothequalityofreportedearnings.
Second, althoughalloftheproxiesbasedonreportedearningsareaffectedbybothfundamentalperformanceandits
measurement, theproxiesarenotequallyaffectedbythesetwofactors.Therefore,theproxiesdonotmeasurethesame
underlying construct.Inaddition,becausetheproxiesfocusondifferentelementsofdecisionusefulness,weshouldnot
expect theproxiestoworkequallywellinallcircumstancesinvestigatedbyresearchers.Wehopethebreadthofthe
discussion ofeachproxyhasshedlightonthecontext-specificdimensionsofqualitycapturedbyeachproxyandonthe
sometimes subtledistinctionsbetweenthem.
As partofourreviewprocess,wenotedfiveareasofresearchthathavereceivedrelativelylittleattention;webelieve
that furtherresearchonthesetopicswouldsubstantiallyenhanceourunderstandingofearningsquality.
(1)Whenmakingchoicesthataffectreportedearnings,amanager’sobjectivefunctioncanincludemultiple,andperhaps
competing,objectives.Theseobjectivescouldrelatetocompensationordebtcontractprovisions,litigationrisk,proprietary
costs,orincentivestoinfluencestockprice,tonameafew.Therearetwonoteworthyfeaturesofthemanager’sdecision
problem.First,managersareconstrainedtoreportonlyoneearningsnumber,buttheexistenceofmultipleobjectivesmay
require trade-offs.Second,managerschoosea set (or portfolio)ofaccountingchoices,notjustone,thatdeterminesearnings,
whichsuggeststhattheymighthavetheflexibilitytotailorindividualelementsofthesettodifferentobjectives.89 Two
interestingpathsforfutureresearchare(i)toexaminehowmanagerschoosebetweencompetingobjectivesand(ii)to
examinechoicesabouttheportfolioofaccountingchoices,specificallywithinthecontextofmeetingmultipleobjectives.
The existingliteratureincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminecompetingmultipleincentives(mostcommonly
financial reporting,taxandregulatoryobjectivesforfinancialinstitutions),butthesestudiestypicallyexaminea single
accounting choice (e.g., loanlossprovisions).Theliteraturealsoincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminemultiple
accounting choicestoachievea single objective (e.g., usingrealearningsmanagementversusdiscretionaryaccruals),but
studies ofthistypearerelativelylimited.Theliteratureincludesalmostnoevidenceonwhetherfirmsoptimizeoveraset
of accountingchoicestomeetmultipleobjectives,despitevariationintheabilityofspecificaccountingchoicestomeet
specific objectives.90 All typesofaccrualchoices,forexample,mayenableafirmtoavoiddebtcovenantviolation,butthey
might differintheirtransparencytoequitymarkets,andhenceintheirimpactonequityvaluationdecisions.
Theorypapershaveexaminedtheimpactofmultipleincentivesonaccountingchoice(e.g., Demski,1973;Evansand
Sridhar,1996;Liang,2004;Chenetal.,2007) andanalyzedtheeffectofvariationsinoptimalcontracts(SridharandMagee,
1996). Thesemodels,however,aregenerallyconcernedwiththeimplicationsofmultipleobjectivesonasingleaccounting
choice;theydonotaddresstheissueofthefirmmakingaportfolioofaccountingchoicesthatintheaggregateaffect
earnings. Christensenetal.(2005) specificallyrecognizethepotentialforaninteractionbetweencompetingincentivesand
individualaccountingchoices: ‘‘Increasingthepersistentcomponentsandreducingthereversiblecomponentsaregenerally
desirableforvaluation,butnotforcontracting.Eliminatingtransitorycomponentsofearningsisgenerallydesirableforvaluation,
butnotnecessarilyforcontracting.’’(p.265) KirschenheiterandMelumad(2002) makearelatedpoint.Assuminganobjective
of equityvaluemaximization,theyshowthatthenatureofthemanager’sprivateinformationaboutcashflows(‘‘good’’news
or ‘‘bad’’news)determineswhethertheoutcomeofheraccountingchoiceswillbesmootherearningsorbigbaths.Thisresult
hasimplicationsforunconditionallyinterpretingsmoothnessasaproxyforearningsmanagement.
Researchers alsocanthinkabout‘‘multiple’’incentivesaschangesinincentivesthroughtime.Domanagerstradeoffthe
immediate benefitsofopportunisticaccountingchoicesatthetimeofaneventsuchasanIPOorSEOagainstthepotential
long-term reputationlossduetotheseone-offearningsmanagementdecisions?

ผลลัพธ์ (ไทย) 1:

7. บทสรุปApproachinthisreviewistodefineearningsqualitybroadlytobedecisionusefulness ของเราซึ่งใน anydecisionbyanyตัดสินใจ Thusthenumberofrelevantarticlesisover300, andbynecessityourdiscussionisbroadเรา emphasizetwosignificantconclusionsbasedonoursurveyoftheearningsqualityliteratureasawhole ครั้งแรกเนื่องจาก alloftheproxiesforearningsqualitythatinvolveearnings (i.e.,propertiessuchaspersistence,timelylossการรับรู้ ราบรื่น andsmallprofits, aswellastheERCs) haveattheircorethereportedaccrual-basedearningsหมายเลข theseproxiesareaffectedbothbythefirm'sfundamentalperformanceandbythemeasurementofperformanceResearchcouldmoreclearlyrecognizethedistinctionbetweenperformanceandperformancemeasurementwhen ในอนาคตทำ predictionsandevaluatingresults Thiswouldhelpusasaprofessiontodeterminethecontributionoftheบัญชี measurementsystemtothequalityofreportedearnings2, althoughalloftheproxiesbasedonreportedearningsareaffectedbybothfundamentalperformanceanditsวัด theproxiesarenotequallyaffectedbythesetwofactors ดังนั้น theproxiesdonotmeasurethesameสร้างต้นแบบ Inaddition, becausetheproxiesfocusondifferentelementsofdecisionusefulness, weshouldnotคาดว่า theproxiestoworkequallywellinallcircumstancesinvestigatedbyresearchers Wehopethebreadthoftheสนทนา ofeachproxyhasshedlightonthecontext-specificdimensionsofqualitycapturedbyeachproxyandontheบางครั้ง subtledistinctionsbetweenthemAs partofourreviewprocess,wenotedfiveareasofresearchthathavereceivedrelativelylittleattention;webelievethat furtherresearchonthesetopicswouldsubstantiallyenhanceourunderstandingofearningsquality.(1)Whenmakingchoicesthataffectreportedearnings,amanager’sobjectivefunctioncanincludemultiple,andperhapscompeting,objectives.Theseobjectivescouldrelatetocompensationordebtcontractprovisions,litigationrisk,proprietarycosts,orincentivestoinfluencestockprice,tonameafew.Therearetwonoteworthyfeaturesofthemanager’sdecisionproblem.First,managersareconstrainedtoreportonlyoneearningsnumber,buttheexistenceofmultipleobjectivesmayrequire trade-offs.Second,managerschoosea set (or portfolio)ofaccountingchoices,notjustone,thatdeterminesearnings,whichsuggeststhattheymighthavetheflexibilitytotailorindividualelementsofthesettodifferentobjectives.89 Twointerestingpathsforfutureresearchare(i)toexaminehowmanagerschoosebetweencompetingobjectivesand(ii)toexaminechoicesabouttheportfolioofaccountingchoices,specificallywithinthecontextofmeetingmultipleobjectives.The existingliteratureincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminecompetingmultipleincentives(mostcommonlyfinancial reporting,taxandregulatoryobjectivesforfinancialinstitutions),butthesestudiestypicallyexaminea singleaccounting choice (e.g., loanlossprovisions).Theliteraturealsoincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminemultipleaccounting choicestoachievea single objective (e.g., usingrealearningsmanagementversusdiscretionaryaccruals),butศึกษา ofthistypearerelativelylimited Theliteratureincludesalmostnoevidenceonwhetherfirmsoptimizeoverasetของ accountingchoicestomeetmultipleobjectives, despitevariationintheabilityofspecificaccountingchoicestomeetobjectives.90 เฉพาะทั้งหมด typesofaccrualchoices, forexample, mayenableafirmtoavoiddebtcovenantviolation, buttheyอาจ differintheirtransparencytoequitymarkets, andhenceintheirimpactonequityvaluationdecisionsTheorypapershaveexaminedtheimpactofmultipleincentivesonaccountingchoice (เช่น Demski, 1973 EvansandSridhar, 1996 เหลียง 2004 Chenetal. 2007) andanalyzedtheeffectofvariationsinoptimalcontracts (SridharandMageeปี 1996) . Thesemodels อย่างไรก็ตาม aregenerallyconcernedwiththeimplicationsofmultipleobjectivesonasingleaccountingเลือก theydonotaddresstheissueofthefirmmakingaportfolioofaccountingchoicesthatintheaggregateaffectกำไร Christensenetal specificallyrecognizethepotentialforaninteractionbetweencompetingincentivesand (2005)individualaccountingchoices: '' Increasingthepersistentcomponentsandreducingthereversiblecomponentsaregenerallydesirableforvaluation, butnotforcontracting Eliminatingtransitorycomponentsofearningsisgenerallydesirableforvaluationbutnotnecessarilyforcontracting '' makearelatedpoint (p.265) KirschenheiterandMelumad(2002) Assuminganobjectiveของ equityvaluemaximization, theyshowthatthenatureofthemanager'sprivateinformationaboutcashflows (ข่าว ''ดี ''หรือข่าว ''เลว '') determineswhethertheoutcomeofheraccountingchoiceswillbesmootherearningsorbigbaths Thisresulthasimplicationsforunconditionallyinterpretingsmoothnessasaproxyforearningsmanagementนักวิจัย alsocanthinkabout นิ้วหลายนิ้ว incentivesaschangesinincentivesthroughtime DomanagerstradeoffthebenefitsofopportunisticaccountingchoicesatthetimeofaneventsuchasanIPOorSEOagainstthepotential ทันทีreputationlossduetotheseone ระยะยาว-offearningsmanagementdecisions

ผลลัพธ์ (ไทย) 2:

7.
สรุปของเราapproachinthisreviewistodefineearningsqualitybroadlytobedecisionusefulness ใน anydecisionbyany
ตัดสินใจ maker.Thusthenumberofrelevantarticlesisover300, andbynecessityourdiscussionisbroad.
เรา เรียบเนียน andsmallprofits, aswellastheERCs) haveattheircorethereportedaccrual-basedearnings จำนวน theseproxiesareaffectedbothbythefirm'sfundamentalperformanceandbythemeasurementofperformance. ในอนาคต researchcouldmoreclearlyrecognizethedistinctionbetweenperformanceandperformancemeasurementwhen ทำ measurementsystemtothequalityofreportedearnings. ประการที่สอง theproxiesarenotequallyaffectedbythesetwofactors.Therefore, theproxiesdonotmeasurethesame พื้นฐาน construct.Inaddition, becausetheproxiesfocusondifferentelementsofdecisionusefulness, weshouldnot คาดหวัง ofeachproxyhasshedlightonthecontext-specificdimensionsofqualitycapturedbyeachproxyandonthe บางครั้ง subtledistinctionsbetweenthem. ในฐานะที่เป็น การค้า offs.Second ชุด managerschoosea (หรือ รายงาน taxandregulatoryobjectivesforfinancialinstitutions) butthesestudiestypicallyexaminea เดียวกับทางเลือกการบัญชี(เช่น loanlossprovisions) .Theliteraturealsoincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminemultiple choicestoachievea บัญชีวัตถุประสงค์เดียว (เช่น usingrealearningsmanagementversusdiscretionaryaccruals) แต่การศึกษาofthistypearerelativelylimited.Theliteratureincludesalmostnoevidenceonwhetherfirmsoptimizeoveraset ของ objectives.90 typesofaccrualchoices ทั้งหมดตามตัวอย่าง mayenableafirmtoavoiddebtcovenantviolation, butthey อาจ Demski 1973; Evansand Sridhar 1996; เหลียง, 2004. Chenetal 2007) andanalyzedtheeffectofvariationsinoptimalcontracts (SridharandMagee, 1996) Christensenetal. (2005) KirschenheiterandMelumad (2002) makearelatedpoint.Assuminganobjective ของ reputationlossduetotheseone-offearningsmanagementdecisions?

ผลลัพธ์ (ไทย) 3:

7 . สรุป approachinthisreviewistodefineearningsqualitybroadlytobedecisionusefulness ของเราในการตัดสินใจ anydecisionbyany เครื่อง

thusthenumberofrelevantarticlesisover300 andbynecessityourdiscussionisbroad , .

เพราะเรา emphasizetwosignificantconclusionsbasedonoursurveyoftheearningsqualityliteratureasawhole ครั้งแรก ( เช่น propertiessuchaspersistence alloftheproxiesforearningsqualitythatinvolveearnings ,timelyloss
รับรู้ ความเรียบเนียน andsmallprofits aswellastheercs ) , haveattheircorethereportedaccrual basedearnings
หมายเลข theseproxiesareaffectedbothbythefirm'sfundamentalperformanceandbythemeasurementofperformance .

ทำให้อนาคต researchcouldmoreclearlyrecognizethedistinctionbetweenperformanceandperformancemeasurementwhen predictionsandevaluatingresults .measurementsystemtothequalityofreportedearnings บัญชี thiswouldhelpusasaprofessiontodeterminethecontributionofthe
.
2 althoughalloftheproxiesbasedonreportedearningsareaffectedbybothfundamentalperformanceandits
วัด theproxiesarenotequallyaffectedbythesetwofactors ดังนั้น theproxiesdonotmeasurethesame
ต้นแบบและสร้าง .becausetheproxiesfocusondifferentelementsofdecisionusefulness weshouldnot
คาดหวัง , theproxiestoworkequallywellinallcircumstancesinvestigatedbyresearchers . wehopethebreadthofthe

บางครั้งการสนทนา ofeachproxyhasshedlightonthecontext specificdimensionsofqualitycapturedbyeachproxyandonthe subtledistinctionsbetweenthem เป็น partofourreviewprocess .
,wenotedfiveareasofresearchthathavereceivedrelativelylittleattention ; webelieve ที่ furtherresearchonthesetopicswouldsubstantiallyenhanceourunderstandingofearningsquality
.
( 1 ) whenmakingchoicesthataffectreportedearnings amanager'sobjectivefunctioncanincludemultiple andperhaps
, , แข่งขัน , วัตถุประสงค์ theseobjectivescouldrelatetocompensationordebtcontractprovisions litigationrisk , ค่าใช้จ่ายส่วนตัว ,
,orincentivestoinfluencestockprice tonameafew , ปัญหา therearetwonoteworthyfeaturesofthemanager'sdecision

managersareconstrainedtoreportonlyoneearningsnumber แรก buttheexistenceofmultipleobjectivesmay
ต้อง trade-offs วินาที managerschoosea ชุด ( หรือเอกสาร ) ofaccountingchoices notjustone thatdeterminesearnings
, , ,whichsuggeststhattheymighthavetheflexibilitytotailorindividualelementsofthesettodifferentobjectives.89 สอง
interestingpathsforfutureresearchare ( ฉัน ) toexaminehowmanagerschoosebetweencompetingobjectivesand ( 2 ) examinechoicesabouttheportfolioofaccountingchoices

,
specificallywithinthecontextofmeetingmultipleobjectives .การ existingliteratureincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminecompetingmultipleincentives ( mostcommonly
การรายงานทางการเงิน taxandregulatoryobjectivesforfinancialinstitutions ) butthesestudiestypicallyexaminea เดียว
บัญชีทางเลือก ( เช่น loanlossprovisions ) theliteraturealsoincludesempiricalstudiesthatexaminemultiple
choicestoachievea มีบัญชีเดียว ( เช่นusingrealearningsmanagementversusdiscretionaryaccruals ) แต่

ของการศึกษา ofthistypearerelativelylimited . theliteratureincludesalmostnoevidenceonwhetherfirmsoptimizeoveraset accountingchoicestomeetmultipleobjectives despitevariationintheabilityofspecificaccountingchoicestomeet
, เฉพาะ objectives.90 ทั้งหมด typesofaccrualchoices คือ mayenableafirmtoavoiddebtcovenantviolation มาก
, ,อาจ differintheirtransparencytoequitymarkets andhenceintheirimpactonequityvaluationdecisions , .
theorypapershaveexaminedtheimpactofmultipleincentivesonaccountingchoice ( เช่น demski 1973 ; evansand
ศรี , 1996 ; เลี่ยง , 2004 ; chenetal . , 2007 ) andanalyzedtheeffectofvariationsinoptimalcontracts ( sridharandmagee
, 1996 ) thesemodels อย่างไรก็ตามaregenerallyconcernedwiththeimplicationsofmultipleobjectivesonasingleaccounting
เลือก กำไร theydonotaddresstheissueofthefirmmakingaportfolioofaccountingchoicesthatintheaggregateaffect

christensenetal . ( 2548 ) specificallyrecognizethepotentialforaninteractionbetweencompetingincentivesand
individualaccountingchoices :' 'increasingthepersistentcomponentsandreducingthereversiblecomponentsaregenerally desirableforvaluation butnotforcontracting eliminatingtransitorycomponentsofearningsisgenerallydesirableforvaluation
, .
butnotnecessarilyforcontracting , ' ' ( p.265 ) kirschenheiterandmelumad ( 2002 ) makearelatedpoint . assuminganobjective ของ equityvaluemaximization
,theyshowthatthenatureofthemanager'sprivateinformationaboutcashflows ( ''good ''news
หรือ ' 'bad ''news ) determineswhethertheoutcomeofheraccountingchoiceswillbesmootherearningsorbigbaths . thisresult hasimplicationsforunconditionallyinterpretingsmoothnessasaproxyforearningsmanagement
.
นักวิจัย alsocanthinkabout ''multiple ''incentivesaschangesinincentivesthroughtime domanagerstradeoffthe
.