4.1 Introduction delegations clearly raise even more troubling constitutional issues than the public counterparts...Thus, we believe it axiomatic that courts should subject private delegations to a more searching scrutiny than their public counterparts Chief Justice Phillips Texas Supreme Court A central issue in the discussion of delegation of governmental power to private actors is the extent to which governmental actors enjoy a capacity to delegate their power in the first instance. Quite simply, ifgovernmental actors lack expansive dele gation capacity, private delegation, and its associated challenges, may be less likely arise. In this chapter, the role of constitutional law in limiting this delegation capacity is examined.2 As will be seen, the experiences of the three jurisdiction under scrutiny seem to suggest that the ability of constitutional law to regulate dele gation capacity will vary according to three factors: first, what could be called th constitutional source of restraint, that is, the existence of constitutional principles o which to construct constitutional doctrines of delegation control; second, contr techniques, such as, for instance, choices between limiting the power that gover mental actors can delegate and, alternatively, allowing governmental actors to de gate power but attaching conditions to the exercise of the power; and third, judi attitudes to the appropriateness of intervening in governance choices that may perceived to be taken more appropriately by the legislature or executive All th factors are inter-related: even if there is a clear source of constitutional restr on private delegation, whether that will be developed in an operational restr depends largely on judicial attitude. Structurally, this chapter is straightforw with each jurisdiction considered in turn.