Recall from Chapter 3 the discussion of the prisoner's dilemma. In that situation, two prisoners were each given the option of confessing to a particular crime but would not know the choice made by the other prisoner. The choices and outcomes in this situation are illustrated in the two-by-two matrix in Figure 5.2. The payoff numbers in the matrix are arbitrary, but they denote the magnitude of the potential gains or losses: the greater the number, the more favorable the payoff. The goal of each prisoner is to avoid the worst possible outcome, and neither prisoner knows which option the other will choose. Suppose you are prisoner 1: according to the matrix in Figure 5.2, your potential payoffs are (clockwise from the upper-left cell) —1, -10, -8, and O. The worst possible payoff to you is -10, which you would get if you did not confess and prisoner 2 did. Thus to avoid this worst possible outcome, you decide to confess, limiting your potential payoffs to O or -8 but avoiding the worst possible, -10. The situation is exactly the same from the perspective of prisoner 2. The solution to the game, then, is that both prisoners confess—-an outcome that is neither the best nor the worst for both players. This solution is a safer solution for both players but not the optimum one, where both individuals cooperate. In this game, there is a disincentive for the individual or the state to cooperate, though cooperation may occur over time, as the result of repeated interaction.