Another aspect of the critique is that structuralism is ahistorical
in three senses, despite L´evi-Strauss’ open concern for
the study of history (1963, pp. 1–30). First, Saussure emphasized
the arbitrariness of the sign. Any word could have been
used to signify the concept of a pot, and any object or space
could have been used to signify boundedness, sexuality, tribal
group, summer and winter. Such an approach is clearly lacking
in a discipline which can follow the way in which signs
come to have non-arbitrary meanings through long-term historical
sequences. Second, specific signs are often taken out of
their historic and geographic contexts and arranged abstractly
to reveal deeper structures of opposition. The signs juggled in
Leroi-Gourhan’s study of Upper Palaeolithic cave paintings,
for example, are drawn from 20,000 years of images and manyoccur.
Certainly one can always say that change involves structural
transformation and this notion is an important one; but
within the structuralist analyses themselves there is little need
for change, and it is difficult to see why the transformations
occur, why they do so in a certain direction, and why or
howthe structures themselves might change radically. This
problem again results from the inadequate linkage between
structure and process and from the minimal role given to the
active individual in the creation of structures.
When pressed to explain differences in structures of
neighbouring societies in South America, L´evi-Strauss (1963,
p. 107) offers a murky account of common foundations that
undergo historical migrations, diffusions and syncretisms. But
he quickly rejects this culture-historical account of change and
difference because it does not ‘correspond to reality, which
presents us with a global picture’. In archaeology, Nash (1997)
locates the source of deep structures of meaning in Jung’s
concept of the collective unconscious. Here, meaning occurs
when archetypes – a priori forms that are hereditary
and grounded in the nervous system – imprint themselves
as images on the world, such as the hero, the trickster and
the mother goddess. This account of structure is unsatisfactory
because it essentially denies the existence of difference:
meaning is universal in the strongest sense – a part of human
biology unmediated by time or place. Our actual experience
in the social and physical world counts for nothing.
Another aspect of the critique is that structuralism is ahistoricalin three senses, despite L´evi-Strauss’ open concern forthe study of history (1963, pp. 1–30). First, Saussure emphasizedthe arbitrariness of the sign. Any word could have beenused to signify the concept of a pot, and any object or spacecould have been used to signify boundedness, sexuality, tribalgroup, summer and winter. Such an approach is clearly lackingin a discipline which can follow the way in which signscome to have non-arbitrary meanings through long-term historicalsequences. Second, specific signs are often taken out oftheir historic and geographic contexts and arranged abstractlyto reveal deeper structures of opposition. The signs juggled inLeroi-Gourhan’s study of Upper Palaeolithic cave paintings,for example, are drawn from 20,000 years of images and manyoccur.Certainly one can always say that change involves structuraltransformation and this notion is an important one; butwithin the structuralist analyses themselves there is little needfor change, and it is difficult to see why the transformationsoccur, why they do so in a certain direction, and why orhowthe structures themselves might change radically. Thisproblem again results from the inadequate linkage betweenstructure and process and from the minimal role given to theactive individual in the creation of structures.When pressed to explain differences in structures ofneighbouring societies in South America, L´evi-Strauss (1963,p. 107) offers a murky account of common foundations thatundergo historical migrations, diffusions and syncretisms. Buthe quickly rejects this culture-historical account of change anddifference because it does not ‘correspond to reality, whichpresents us with a global picture’. In archaeology, Nash (1997)locates the source of deep structures of meaning in Jung’sconcept of the collective unconscious. Here, meaning occurswhen archetypes – a priori forms that are hereditaryand grounded in the nervous system – imprint themselvesas images on the world, such as the hero, the trickster andthe mother goddess. This account of structure is unsatisfactorybecause it essentially denies the existence of difference:meaning is universal in the strongest sense – a part of humanbiology unmediated by time or place. Our actual experiencein the social and physical world counts for nothing.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..
Another aspect of the critique is that structuralism is ahistorical
in three senses, despite L´evi-Strauss’ open concern for
the study of history (1963, pp. 1–30). First, Saussure emphasized
the arbitrariness of the sign. Any word could have been
used to signify the concept of a pot, and any object or space
could have been used to signify boundedness, sexuality, tribal
group, summer and winter. Such an approach is clearly lacking
in a discipline which can follow the way in which signs
come to have non-arbitrary meanings through long-term historical
sequences. Second, specific signs are often taken out of
their historic and geographic contexts and arranged abstractly
to reveal deeper structures of opposition. The signs juggled in
Leroi-Gourhan’s study of Upper Palaeolithic cave paintings,
for example, are drawn from 20,000 years of images and manyoccur.
Certainly one can always say that change involves structural
transformation and this notion is an important one; but
within the structuralist analyses themselves there is little need
for change, and it is difficult to see why the transformations
occur, why they do so in a certain direction, and why or
howthe structures themselves might change radically. This
problem again results from the inadequate linkage between
structure and process and from the minimal role given to the
active individual in the creation of structures.
When pressed to explain differences in structures of
neighbouring societies in South America, L´evi-Strauss (1963,
p. 107) offers a murky account of common foundations that
undergo historical migrations, diffusions and syncretisms. But
he quickly rejects this culture-historical account of change and
difference because it does not ‘correspond to reality, which
presents us with a global picture’. In archaeology, Nash (1997)
locates the source of deep structures of meaning in Jung’s
concept of the collective unconscious. Here, meaning occurs
when archetypes – a priori forms that are hereditary
and grounded in the nervous system – imprint themselves
as images on the world, such as the hero, the trickster and
the mother goddess. This account of structure is unsatisfactory
because it essentially denies the existence of difference:
meaning is universal in the strongest sense – a part of human
biology unmediated by time or place. Our actual experience
in the social and physical world counts for nothing.
การแปล กรุณารอสักครู่..