First, the model identifies the pre-fraud state of nature as perceived by the perpetrator (left-hand
side). Following from Cressey’s (1953) original work, the model characterizes perpetrators as the
initial decision makers, the ones who must consider their personal and professional situation as well
as their perception of the deterrence, prevention, and detection fabric in place to determine if a
fraudulent act can be successful in both (1) execution and (2) concealment. Moving to the far right,
the model examines the post-fraud state and focuses on the specific elements of the fraud or
financial crime (W. Albrecht, C. C. Albrecht, C. O. Albrecht, and Zimbelman 2012): the criminal
act, the efforts to conceal the act, and an identification of what (and how) benefits accrue to the
perpetrator (i.e., conversion—for example, incremental bonuses, unwarranted stock market gains,
or, in the case of asset misappropriation, the conversion of stolen assets). In the center of the
model—between the perpetrator and the criminal act—are the organizational and societal
interventions (e.g., internal controls, broader elements of corporate governance, legal and regulatory
environment, external auditing) aimed at reducing the incidence and impact of fraudulent acts.
These interventions have been characterized as prevention, deterrence, and detection.2 Each of these
is at least partially outside the control of the perpetrator, yet they influence the perpetrator’s
assessment of the probability of success in terms of completing and concealing the criminal act.