entifick knowledge s,t ands in relation to the rest much as the definition of the moral virtues stands to its specific manifestations, for scientific knowledge is defined simply as the habit
of demonstration - as moral virtue had been defined as habit concerned with choice -and
the remaining four are differentiated from it by specifying either the objects or the principles of such knowledge. The two virtues of the calculative part of the soul are distinguished by the activities they respectively direct, art being the habit of making
according to true reason, prudence the habit of acting with regard to human goods according to true reason. The two remaining virtues of the scientific part of the soul are distinguished according to activities which are involved in the judgments and arguments of scientific knowledge itself: intuitive reasons assigned by a process of dialectical elimination to the treatment and possession of principles, while wisdom (ofoi4a) is identified by a process of dialectical summation as the most accurate of the sciences, requiring
the combination of intuitive reasoning and scientific knowledge, concerning the highest objects. In the dialectical ascent from the moral to the intellectual virtues, from the consideration of the passions and actions with which the virtues are concerned to the consideration of the rules and reasons according to which virtuous actions are performed,
two distinctions are constantly at work: (1) the perpendicular distinction of efficient and final cause, of the materials by which choice is determined and the objectives by
which reason and desire are determined, and (2) the horizontal distinction of part and whole, individual and group. The list of the moral virtues, thus, culminates in justice, which is the whole of virtue in one sense, that is, not in an absolute sense but in relation to our neighbor, and which in another sense is