In each of these cases--and many more examples could be cited--the jurisdiction in question either put into place a wholly new governing instrument or made such far reaching changes to existing documents that it is reasonable to say that the very basis of law and state had been altered. We are dealing, that is, with more than mere constitutional amendment. It is, admittedly, impossible to draw a precise line between amendment and replacement and the procedures established for the former are sometimes employed in effecting the latter. The enactments of the new Sri Lankan constitutions in 1972 and 1978 are examples. In a much-noted judgment, the Hungarian Constitutional Court declared that the 1989 “amendments” to the Communist Constitution of 1949 “conferred on the state, its law and the political system a new quality, fundamentally different from that of the previous regime” and, therefore, they “gave rise to a new Constitution.”42 Michel Rosenfeld notes that “since 1989 every section of the Hungarian Constitution has been changed except for the *724 section which specifies that Budapest is the capital.”43 Yet the Constitution is still presented on the website of the Hungarian Constitutional Court with the title, “The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (Act XX of 1949 as revised and restated by Act XXXI of 198944).” The idea, however, that any and every constitutional change can be accomplished by virtue of an authority that is itself created by a constitution has been increasingly doubted. The most prominent expression of this distinction is probably the Indian Supreme Court’s judgment in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,45 holding that the constitutional amendment power did not extend to alterations of certain basic features of the constitution. The amending authority, as explained in a subsequent judgment, creates no right “to destroy the identity of the Constitution.”46 The character of this reasoning is highlighted by distinguishing the Indian Court’s decision in Kesavananda Bharati from that in an earlier case. In Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, the Court had also held a procedurally perfect amendment to the Constitution invalid. In Golak Nath, however, the analysis turned on the particular language of the existing constitution. The majority in the earlier case relied on the facts that 1) Article 13 prohibited the making of “any law” abridging guaranteed individual rights, and 2) an amendment to the Constitution, a parliamentary act, was a “law” subject to the limitations of Article 13. When, predictably, Parliament amended Article 13 to exclude constitutional amendments from the category of laws so limited, the Supreme Court was obliged to address the issue in more general terms.47