About this point, Fridson (1993) commented:
Almost invariably, companies try to dispel the impression that their growth is decelerating, since that perception can be so costly to them. (pp. 7–8)
I thus foresaw a positive relationship between the SGIand the probability of earnings manipulation.
■ Depreciation index. The DEPIis the ratio of the rate of depreciation in yeart– 1 to the corresponding rate in year t. The depreciation rate in a given year is equal to Depreciation/(Depreciation + Net PP&E). A DEPIgreater than 1 indicates that
the rate at which assets are being depreciated has slowed—raising the possibility that the company has revised upward the estimates of assets’ useful lives or adopted a new method that is income increasing.12 I thus expected a positive relation-ship between the DEPIand the probability of manipulation.
■ Sales, general, and administrative expenses index. The SGAIis the ratio of sales, general, and administrative expenses to sales in year trelative to the corresponding measure in year t– 1. The use of this variable follows the recommendation of Lev and Thiagarajan that analysts interpret a disproportionate increase in sales as a negative signal
about a company’s future prospects. I expected to find a positive relationship between the SGAIand the probability of manipulation.
■ Leverage index. The LVGIis the ratio of total debt to total assets in year trelative to the corresponding ratio in year t– 1. An LVGIgreater than 1 indicates an increase in leverage. This variable was included to capture incentives in debt cove-nants for earnings manipulation. Assuming that leverage follows a random walk, the LVGIimplic-itly measures the leverage forecast error. I used the change in leverage in a company’s capital structure on the basis of evidence in Beneish and Press (1993) that such changes are associated with the stock market effect of technical default.