Introduction
In most markets trade does not involve just producers and consumers but also one or more
middlemen serving as intermediaries. For example, brokers and market makers ll this
role in nancial markets as do wholesalers and retailers in many manufacturing industries.
Classical economic approaches to studying markets, such as competitive equilibrium analysis,
largely abstract away the role of such middlemen; a point made in the introduction of
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), who attribute this is to a lack of modeling how trade occurs
and the associated frictions involved. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) oer a solution to
this shortcoming by adopting a search theoretic model as in Diamond and Maskin (1979),
Mortensen (1982), Diamond (1982). Agents meet pairwise over time and must wait until
they meet a suitable partner to trade. The time it takes to nd a partner is costly thus
introducing a search friction. The role of middlemen is in reducing this friction. Subsequently
there has been much work in studying dierent models of trade (e.g., various non-cooperative
bargaining models) and using these to analyze how middlemen in
uence the formation of
prices and the eciency of trade.
Much of the aforementioned work has focused on models in which all producers and
consumers have access to the same middlemen. However, often this is not the case due,
for example, to various institutional or physical barriers. One example of this as pointed
out by Blume et al. (2009) is in agricultural supply chains of developing countries. In such
cases, due to inadequate transportation infrastructure, farmers may only be able to trade in
local markets. Such relationships are naturally modeled via a network. Blume et al. (2009)
consider such trading networks with a focus on characterizing how network structure eects
equilibrium prices set by middlemen which have full information and full bargaining power
and so there are no trading frictions. Similar equilibrium questions have also been studied
in the supply chain literature (e.g. Nagurney et al. (2002)).
IntroductionIn most markets trade does not involve just producers and consumers but also one or moremiddlemen serving as intermediaries. For example, brokers and market makers ll thisrole in nancial markets as do wholesalers and retailers in many manufacturing industries.Classical economic approaches to studying markets, such as competitive equilibrium analysis,largely abstract away the role of such middlemen; a point made in the introduction ofRubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), who attribute this is to a lack of modeling how trade occursand the associated frictions involved. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987) o er a solution tothis shortcoming by adopting a search theoretic model as in Diamond and Maskin (1979),Mortensen (1982), Diamond (1982). Agents meet pairwise over time and must wait untilthey meet a suitable partner to trade. The time it takes to nd a partner is costly thusintroducing a search friction. The role of middlemen is in reducing this friction. Subsequentlythere has been much work in studying di erent models of trade (e.g., various non-cooperativebargaining models) and using these to analyze how middlemen inuence the formation ofprices and the eciency of trade.Much of the aforementioned work has focused on models in which all producers andconsumers have access to the same middlemen. However, often this is not the case due,for example, to various institutional or physical barriers. One example of this as pointedออกโดยบลูเม et al. (2009) ที่อยู่ในห่วงโซ่อุปทานทางการเกษตรของประเทศกำลังพัฒนา ในดังกล่าวกรณี เนื่องจากโครงสร้างพื้นฐานการขนส่งไม่เพียงพอ เกษตรกรอาจไม่สามารถทำค้าในตลาดท้องถิ่น ความสัมพันธ์ดังกล่าวเป็นจำลองธรรมชาติผ่านเครือข่าย บลูเม et al. (2009)พิจารณาการค้าเช่นเครือข่ายที่ มีการเน้นในการกำหนดลักษณะของเครือข่ายโครงสร้างอี ects วิธีโดยพ่อค้าคนกลางที่มีข้อมูลที่ครบถ้วนและอำนาจต่อรองทั้งราคาสมดุลและมี frictions ไม่ค้า ศึกษาสมดุลคำถามที่คล้ายกันยังในซัพพลายเชนวรรณคดี (เช่น Nagurney et al. (2002))
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