tion of their value, as described above. But it can’t make
sense to demand as a matter of right that we come up with
a final concluding judgment that their value is great, or equal
to others’. That is, if the judgment of value is to register
something independent of our own wills and desires, it cannot
be dictated by a principle of ethics. On examination, either
we will find something of great value in culture C, or we
will not. But it makes no more sense to demand that we do
so than it does to demand that we find the earth round or
flat, the temperature of the air hot or cold.
I have stated this rather flatly, when as everyone knows
there is a vigorous controversy over the “objectivity” of judgments
in this field, and whether there is a “truth of the matter”
here, as there seems to be in natural science, or indeed,
whether even in natural science “objectivity” is a mirage. I
do not have space to address this here. I have discussed it
somewhat elsewhere.40 I don’t have much sympathy for
these forms of subjectivism, which I think are shot through
with confusion. But there seems to be some special confusion
in invoking them in this context. The moral and political
thrust of the complaint concerns unjustified judgments of inferior
status allegedly made of nonhegemonic cultures. But if
those judgments are ultimately a question of the human will,
then the issue of justification falls away. One doesn’t, properly
speaking, make judgments that can be right or wrong;
one expresses liking or dislike, one endorses or rejects another
culture. But then the complaint must shift to address
the refusal to endorse, and the validity or invalidity of judgments
here has nothing to do with it.
Then, however, the act of declaring another culture’s creations
to be of worth and the act of declaring oneself on their
side, even if their creations aren’t all that impressive, become
indistinguishable. The difference is only in the packaging.
Yet the first is normally understood as a genuine expression
tion of their value, as described above. But it can’t make
sense to demand as a matter of right that we come up with
a final concluding judgment that their value is great, or equal
to others’. That is, if the judgment of value is to register
something independent of our own wills and desires, it cannot
be dictated by a principle of ethics. On examination, either
we will find something of great value in culture C, or we
will not. But it makes no more sense to demand that we do
so than it does to demand that we find the earth round or
flat, the temperature of the air hot or cold.
I have stated this rather flatly, when as everyone knows
there is a vigorous controversy over the “objectivity” of judgments
in this field, and whether there is a “truth of the matter”
here, as there seems to be in natural science, or indeed,
whether even in natural science “objectivity” is a mirage. I
do not have space to address this here. I have discussed it
somewhat elsewhere.40 I don’t have much sympathy for
these forms of subjectivism, which I think are shot through
with confusion. But there seems to be some special confusion
in invoking them in this context. The moral and political
thrust of the complaint concerns unjustified judgments of inferior
status allegedly made of nonhegemonic cultures. But if
those judgments are ultimately a question of the human will,
then the issue of justification falls away. One doesn’t, properly
speaking, make judgments that can be right or wrong;
one expresses liking or dislike, one endorses or rejects another
culture. But then the complaint must shift to address
the refusal to endorse, and the validity or invalidity of judgments
here has nothing to do with it.
Then, however, the act of declaring another culture’s creations
to be of worth and the act of declaring oneself on their
side, even if their creations aren’t all that impressive, become
indistinguishable. The difference is only in the packaging.
Yet the first is normally understood as a genuine expression
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