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FindLawCaselawTexasTX Supreme Ct.Randall Kallinen and Paul Kubosh, Petitioners, v. The City of Houston, Respondent
Randall Kallinen and Paul Kubosh, Petitioners, v. The City of Houston, Respondent
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Supreme Court of Texas.
Randall Kallinen and Paul Kubosh, Petitioners, v. The City of Houston, Respondent


NO. 14–0015
Decided: March 20, 2015
The Texas Public Information Act (“PIA”), Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code, “guarantees access to public information, subject to certain exceptions.”  Tex. Dep't Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex.2011).   The PIA provides that when a governmental body receives a written request for information for which it wishes to claim an exception, it must timely seek a ruling from the Attorney General if the exception's applicability to the requested information has not previously beendetermined.  TEX. GOV'T CODE § 552.301(a);  see also id. § 552.301(g).  But the PIA also provides that a requestor may sue to compel disclosure of the information.  TEX. GOV'T CODE § 552.321(a).   In this case, the court of appeals held that a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such a suit until the Attorney General rules.  414 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2013).   We disagree.

Invoking the PIA, Randall Kallinen requested information from the City of Houston regarding a study of traffic light cameras it had commissioned.   The City produced a large number of documents but withheld some and timely asked the Attorney General for an opinion on whether the PIA excepted the withheld information from disclosure.   The PIA gives the Attorney General forty-five business days to issue opinions, though the time can beextended.  TEX. GOV'T CODE § 552.306(a).   But before this time elapsed and before the Attorney General ruled, Kallinen sued for a writ of mandamus to compel the City to disclose the withheld information.   The City moved to abate the lawsuit pending the Attorney General's ruling, but the Attorney General closed his file when he was alerted to the suit.   At the time, the Attorney General did not interpret the PIA to require an open records ruling on issues already in litigation.   See Tex. Att'y Gen. OR2011–687 (citing Tex. Att'y Gen. OR1990–560 at 3 (declining to rule on sensitive information on the ground the issues should be resolved in the pending Texas prison litigation), and A & T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp, 904 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex.1995) (noting in dicta that the Attorney General withdrew his opinion pending litigation on PIA questions)).

The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over the suit until the Attorney General ruled.   The district court overruled the plea, granted summary judgment for Kallinen, ordered disclosure of many of the withheld documents, and awarded Kallinen $175,664 in attorney fees through appeal to this Court.

The City complied with the order to disclose but appealed the attorney fee award.   The parties agree that the only basis for the trial court's jurisdiction is Section 552.321(a) of the PIA. That provision, with subsections inserted in brackets for ease of reference, conditions the court's exercise of jurisdiction as follows:

A requestor or the attorney general may file suit for a writ of mandamus compelling a governmental body to make information available for public inspection if the governmental body [A] refuses to request an attorney general's decision ․ or [B] refuses to supply [1] public information or [2] information that the attorney general has determined is public information that is not excepted from disclosure.

TEX. G OV 'T CODE § 552.321(a).   The parties agree that conditions A and B2 do not apply.   The court of appeals reasoned that condition B1 cannot apply when the governmental body is challenging whether an exception to disclosure applies because the information has not yet been determined to be public.   414 S.W.3d at 818.   Accepting the City's argument, the court stated that the Attorney General must determine whether information is subject to disclosure when asked to do so, that he has exclusive jurisdiction to make that determination in the first instance, that the requestor of information must exhaust all administrative remedies before suing, and that therefore a trial court's jurisdiction over a requestor's suit “only arises after the Attorney General has ruled.”  Id. at 818–20.

The City's position is flawed in several respects.   First, it equates information that is public with information that has been determined by the Attorney General to be public, so that condition B2 swallows up condition B1. This violates a duty of statutory interpretation to “give effect to all the words of a statute and not treat any statutory language as surplusage if possible.”  Chevron Corp. v. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex.1987).

Further, the City's view of Section 552.321(a) would relegate mandamus relief to compelling a governmental body to request an Attorney General's decision and then comply with it.   The correctness of that decision would be unreviewable.   But we have reviewed the Attorney General's rulings. See Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d at 113;  In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 329–36 (Tex.2001).   And we have interpreted PIA exceptions without a ruling by the Attorney General.   See City of Garland v. Dall. Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 358–64 (Tex.2000);  A & T Consultants, Inc., 904 S.W.2d at 671, 674–81.   The court of appeals' interpretation ignores these cases.

The City argues, and the court of appeals held, that requestors of information should be required to exhaust their remedies in placing disputes before the Attorney General before resorting to the courts.   But requestors have no such remedies.   While the Attorney General may invite their arguments, they have no right to request or demand a ruling or disclosure from the Attorney General, and no right to an administrative appeal.   See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 552.304.   Requestors cannot be required to finish something they have no right to start.   The requirement that a governmental body seek a ruling from the Attorney General when withholding requested information is a check on the governmental body, not a remedy for the requestor to exhaust.   And again, the City's view of Section 552.321(a) would make the Attorney General's ruling unreviewable.

The City argues that because information is generally “presumed to be subject to required public disclosure” when a governmental body fails to timely request an Attorney General's ruling, TEX. GOV'T CODE § 552.302, the information should not be considered public when a ruling is requested.   But the premise cannot establish its converse.   One may infer from a governmental body's failure to request a ruling that the body is not claiming an exclusion, else it would advance its position in compliance with prescribed procedures.   See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 552.301.   One cannot likewise infer that just because a governmental body properly seeks an Attorney General's ruling, its exclusion claim must be correct.

The Attorney General advises in an amicus brief that he does not claim exclusive jurisdiction to decide open records issues.   Consistent with that position, at the time of the City's request for a ruling, as noted above, the Attorney General's policy was not to rule on issues in litigation.   See Tex. Att'y Gen. OR2011–687.   In reversing that policy, he does not claim the authority to rule without court review.

A requestor of information certainly has the choice to await the Attorney General's decision.   A governmental body may decide to release the requested information during the process and on receipt of an adverse opinion from the Attorney General.   Efficiency may counsel patience.   But the governmental body is entitled to insist on its position to a final ruling, see TEX. G OV'T CODE § 552.324, and a requestor is not required to defer a suit for mandamus.

A court may decide, exercising sound discretion, to abate proceedings to await the Attorney General's ruling.   The Attorney General characterizes its authority as akin to primary jurisdiction, a prudential doctrine that applies when an agency is “staffed with experts trained in handling the complex problems in the agency's purview” and there is a benefit to be “derived from [the] agency[ ] uniformly interpreting its laws, rules, and regulations.”   Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex.2002).   The Legislature has expressly charged the Attorney General with maintaining “uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation” of the PIA, TEX. GOV'T CODE § 552.011, and the Office of the Attorney General is experienced in interpreting and applying the subchapter C exceptions.   If the court determines that under the circumstances of a particular case a decision from the Attorney General before adjudication of the merits of disclosure would be beneficial and any delay would not impinge on a requestor's right to information, abatement would be within the court's discretion.

The court of appeals erred in dismissing Kallinen's suit for want of jurisdiction.   Accordingly, we grant the petition for review and, without hearing oral argument, reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand to that court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.  TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1.

PER CURIAM


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ผลลัพธ์ (ไทย) 1:

V FindLawCaselawTexasTX Ct.Randall Kallinen สุพรีมและ Paul Kubosh, Petitioners เมืองฮุสตัน ตอบV Randall Kallinen และ Paul Kubosh, Petitioners เมืองฮุสตัน ตอบResetAAFont ขนาด: พิมพ์ สุพรีมคอร์ทของเท็กซัสV Randall Kallinen และ Paul Kubosh, Petitioners เมืองฮุสตัน ตอบหมายเลข 14-0015 ตัดสินใจ: 20 มีนาคม 2015เท็กซัสสาธารณะข้อมูลบัญญัติ ("เปียะ"), 552 บทรหัสรัฐเท็กซัส "รับประกันการเข้าถึงข้อมูลสาธารณะ มีข้อยกเว้นบางอย่าง" Tex. Dep't ผับ ตู้ v. หนังสือพิมพ์ Tex. ค็อกซ์ L.P., 343 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex.2011) PIA แสดงว่า เมื่อร่างรัฐรับคำขอเป็นลายลักษณ์อักษรสำหรับข้อมูลจึงต้องอ้างข้อยกเว้น มันต้องทันเวลาแสวงหาปกครองจากอัยการถ้าก่อนหน้านี้ไม่มีความเกี่ยวข้องของข้อยกเว้นของข้อมูลที่ร้องขอ beendetermined TEX. GOV'T รหัสแท้ 552.301(a) ดูรหัส แสดง 552.301(g) แต่ PIA ยังแสดงว่า ผู้ที่อาจฟ้องร้องการบังคับการเปิดเผยข้อมูล TEX. GOV'T รหัสแท้ 552.321(a) ในกรณีนี้ อุทธรณ์ของศาลถือว่า ศาลทดลองขาดเรื่องอำนาจเหนือชุดดังกล่าวจนกว่าอัยการสูงกฎ 414 S.W.3d 815, 820 (Tex.App.–Houston [Dist. 1] 2013) เราไม่เห็นด้วยInvoking the PIA, Randall Kallinen requested information from the City of Houston regarding a study of traffic light cameras it had commissioned. The City produced a large number of documents but withheld some and timely asked the Attorney General for an opinion on whether the PIA excepted the withheld information from disclosure. The PIA gives the Attorney General forty-five business days to issue opinions, though the time can beextended. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 552.306(a). But before this time elapsed and before the Attorney General ruled, Kallinen sued for a writ of mandamus to compel the City to disclose the withheld information. The City moved to abate the lawsuit pending the Attorney General's ruling, but the Attorney General closed his file when he was alerted to the suit. At the time, the Attorney General did not interpret the PIA to require an open records ruling on issues already in litigation. See Tex. Att'y Gen. OR2011–687 (citing Tex. Att'y Gen. OR1990–560 at 3 (declining to rule on sensitive information on the ground the issues should be resolved in the pending Texas prison litigation), and A & T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp, 904 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex.1995) (noting in dicta that the Attorney General withdrew his opinion pending litigation on PIA questions)).The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over the suit until the Attorney General ruled. The district court overruled the plea, granted summary judgment for Kallinen, ordered disclosure of many of the withheld documents, and awarded Kallinen $175,664 in attorney fees through appeal to this Court.The City complied with the order to disclose but appealed the attorney fee award. The parties agree that the only basis for the trial court's jurisdiction is Section 552.321(a) of the PIA. That provision, with subsections inserted in brackets for ease of reference, conditions the court's exercise of jurisdiction as follows:A requestor or the attorney general may file suit for a writ of mandamus compelling a governmental body to make information available for public inspection if the governmental body [A] refuses to request an attorney general's decision ․ or [B] refuses to supply [1] public information or [2] information that the attorney general has determined is public information that is not excepted from disclosure.TEX. G OV 'T CODE § 552.321(a). The parties agree that conditions A and B2 do not apply. The court of appeals reasoned that condition B1 cannot apply when the governmental body is challenging whether an exception to disclosure applies because the information has not yet been determined to be public. 414 S.W.3d at 818. Accepting the City's argument, the court stated that the Attorney General must determine whether information is subject to disclosure when asked to do so, that he has exclusive jurisdiction to make that determination in the first instance, that the requestor of information must exhaust all administrative remedies before suing, and that therefore a trial court's jurisdiction over a requestor's suit “only arises after the Attorney General has ruled.” Id. at 818–20.The City's position is flawed in several respects. First, it equates information that is public with information that has been determined by the Attorney General to be public, so that condition B2 swallows up condition B1. This violates a duty of statutory interpretation to “give effect to all the words of a statute and not treat any statutory language as surplusage if possible.” Chevron Corp. v. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex.1987).Further, the City's view of Section 552.321(a) would relegate mandamus relief to compelling a governmental body to request an Attorney General's decision and then comply with it. The correctness of that decision would be unreviewable. But we have reviewed the Attorney General's rulings. See Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d at 113; In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 329–36 (Tex.2001). And we have interpreted PIA exceptions without a ruling by the Attorney General. See City of Garland v. Dall. Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 358–64 (Tex.2000); A & T Consultants, Inc., 904 S.W.2d at 671, 674–81. The court of appeals' interpretation ignores these cases.The City argues, and the court of appeals held, that requestors of information should be required to exhaust their remedies in placing disputes before the Attorney General before resorting to the courts. But requestors have no such remedies. While the Attorney General may invite their arguments, they have no right to request or demand a ruling or disclosure from the Attorney General, and no right to an administrative appeal. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 552.304. Requestors cannot be required to finish something they have no right to start. The requirement that a governmental body seek a ruling from the Attorney General when withholding requested information is a check on the governmental body, not a remedy for the requestor to exhaust. And again, the City's view of Section 552.321(a) would make the Attorney General's ruling unreviewable.
The City argues that because information is generally “presumed to be subject to required public disclosure” when a governmental body fails to timely request an Attorney General's ruling, TEX. GOV'T CODE § 552.302, the information should not be considered public when a ruling is requested.   But the premise cannot establish its converse.   One may infer from a governmental body's failure to request a ruling that the body is not claiming an exclusion, else it would advance its position in compliance with prescribed procedures.   See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 552.301.   One cannot likewise infer that just because a governmental body properly seeks an Attorney General's ruling, its exclusion claim must be correct.

The Attorney General advises in an amicus brief that he does not claim exclusive jurisdiction to decide open records issues.   Consistent with that position, at the time of the City's request for a ruling, as noted above, the Attorney General's policy was not to rule on issues in litigation.   See Tex. Att'y Gen. OR2011–687.   In reversing that policy, he does not claim the authority to rule without court review.

A requestor of information certainly has the choice to await the Attorney General's decision.   A governmental body may decide to release the requested information during the process and on receipt of an adverse opinion from the Attorney General.   Efficiency may counsel patience.   But the governmental body is entitled to insist on its position to a final ruling, see TEX. G OV'T CODE § 552.324, and a requestor is not required to defer a suit for mandamus.

A court may decide, exercising sound discretion, to abate proceedings to await the Attorney General's ruling.   The Attorney General characterizes its authority as akin to primary jurisdiction, a prudential doctrine that applies when an agency is “staffed with experts trained in handling the complex problems in the agency's purview” and there is a benefit to be “derived from [the] agency[ ] uniformly interpreting its laws, rules, and regulations.”   Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex.2002).   The Legislature has expressly charged the Attorney General with maintaining “uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation” of the PIA, TEX. GOV'T CODE § 552.011, and the Office of the Attorney General is experienced in interpreting and applying the subchapter C exceptions.   If the court determines that under the circumstances of a particular case a decision from the Attorney General before adjudication of the merits of disclosure would be beneficial and any delay would not impinge on a requestor's right to information, abatement would be within the court's discretion.

The court of appeals erred in dismissing Kallinen's suit for want of jurisdiction.   Accordingly, we grant the petition for review and, without hearing oral argument, reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand to that court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.  TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1.

PER CURIAM


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ผลลัพธ์ (ไทย) 3:

findlawcaselawtexastx สูงสุดกะรัต แรนดอล kallinen และพอล kubosh ชาวบ้าน , วีเมือง Houston เลย
kallinen แรนพอล kubosh ชาวบ้าน , V , เมืองฮุสตัน ขนาด resetaafont เลย

: พิมพ์ศาลฎีกาของเท็กซัส kallinen
แรนพอล kubosh ชาวบ้าน , V , เมืองฮุสตันเลย

,

ตัดสินใจ : 0015 หมายเลข 14 – 20 มีนาคม 2015
เท็กซัสข้อมูลสาธารณะ ( " และ " ) , บทที่มาของเท็กซัสรัฐรหัส " รับประกันการเข้าถึงข้อมูลสาธารณะ ต้องมีข้อยกเว้น "  เท็กซ์คงไม่ผับ ความปลอดภัย , Cox เท็กซ์หนังสือพิมพ์ Global 343 s.w.3d , 112 , 114 ( tex.2011 )  ที่ยังให้การว่า เมื่อร่างกายของรัฐได้รับการร้องขอเป็นลายลักษณ์อักษรสำหรับข้อมูลที่ต้องการอ้างข้อยกเว้นมันต้องทันเวลา ขอพิจารณาจากอัยการสูงสุด ถ้าเป็นข้อยกเว้นการบังคับใช้เพื่อขอข้อมูลได้จาก beendetermined .  เท็กซ์ gov ไม่ได้รหัส§ 552.301 ( ) ;  ดู ID § 552.301 ( G )  แต่ยังยังมีที่ requestor อาจฟ้องเพื่อบังคับให้เปิดเผยข้อมูล  เท็กซ์ gov ไม่ได้รหัส§ 552.321 ( )  ในกรณีนี้ศาลอุทธรณ์ศาลจัดขึ้นที่ขาดเรื่องอำนาจเช่นชุดจนกว่าทนายทั่วไปกฏ   414 s.w.3d 815 820 ( tex.app –ฮูสตัน [ 1 ] 2013 dist )  เราเห็นด้วย

invoking เปีย แรนดัล kallinen ร้องขอข้อมูลจากเมืองฮุสตันเกี่ยวกับการศึกษาของกล้องไฟจราจรได้มอบหมาย เมืองที่ผลิตเป็นจำนวนมากของเอกสาร แต่ปิดบังบางส่วนและทันเวลาขอให้อัยการสูงสุดให้ความเห็นว่า ยังยกเว้นการปิดบังข้อมูลการเปิดเผย  ที่เปียให้อัยการสูงสุด 45 วันจะออกความคิดเห็น แม้ว่าเวลาที่สามารถขยายขอบเขต .  เท็กซ์ gov ไม่ได้รหัส§ 552.306 ( )  แต่ก่อนนี้เวลาที่ผ่านไปและก่อนที่อัยการสูงสุดปกครอง kallinen ฟ้องสำหรับคำสั่งของศาลสูงให้เมืองที่จะเปิดเผยปิดบังข้อมูล  เมืองย้ายคลายคดีระหว่างอัยการสูงสุดตัดสิน แต่อัยการสูงสุดปิดแฟ้มของเขาเมื่อเขาเป็นแจ้งเตือนไปยังชุด  ในเวลาอัยการสูงสุดไม่ได้ตีความมากเกินไปที่จะต้องพิจารณาในประเด็นประวัติเปิดแล้วในคดีได้  เห็นเท็กซ์ att'y พล.อ. or2011 – 687 ( อ้างถึงเท็กซ์ att'y พล.อ. or1990 – 560 ที่ 3 แต่จะปกครองตามข้อมูลที่สำคัญในพื้นที่ปัญหาควรได้รับการแก้ไขในการพิจารณาคดีเท็กซัสคุก ) และที่ปรึกษา T & , Inc โวลต์คม , 904 s.w.2d 668 , 671 ( เท็กซ์1995 ) ( สังเกตว่าในเผด็อัยการสูงสุดถอนความเห็นของเขาระหว่างการ พิจารณาคดีในคำถามเปีย ) )

เมืองยื่นขอสังกัดเถียงว่า ศาลไม่มีเขตอำนาจเหนือชุดจนกว่าอัยการปกครอง  ศาลแขวงปฏิเสธข้ออ้าง , ได้รับการตัดสินสรุปสำหรับ kallinen สั่งให้เปิดเผยข้อมูลมากมายของเอกสารและได้รับรางวัล kallinen $ 175664 ค่าธรรมเนียมทนายความผ่านอุทธรณ์ต่อศาลนี้

เมืองปฏิบัติตามคำสั่งให้เปิดเผย แต่อุทธรณ์ทนายความค่าธรรมเนียม รางวัล  คู่กรณียอมรับว่าพื้นฐานเท่านั้น สำหรับการทดลองใช้เขตอำนาจของศาล มาตรา 552.321 ( ) ของเพีย . ว่า บทบัญญัติในอนุมาตราที่มีแทรกอยู่ในเครื่องหมายวงเล็บเพื่อความสะดวกในการอ้างอิงเงื่อนไขของศาลใช้อำนาจดังนี้

เป็น requestor หรืออัยการสูงสุดจะยื่นชุดสำหรับคำสั่งของศาลสูงบังคับร่างกายของรัฐ เพื่อให้ข้อมูลที่พร้อมใช้งานสำหรับการตรวจสอบสาธารณะถ้าร่างกายของรัฐ [ ] ปฏิเสธการร้องขอทนายความทั่วไปของการตัดสินใจ․หรือ [ b ] ปฏิเสธที่จะจัดหาข้อมูลสาธารณะหรือ [ 1 ] [ 2 ] ข้อมูลว่า อัยการสูงสุดได้พิจารณาเป็นข้อมูลสาธารณะที่ไม่คาดคิดจาก

เท็กซ์กรัม  ov ไม่รหัส§ 552.321 ( )  ฝ่ายตกลงเงื่อนไขและ B2 ไม่ใช้  ศาลอุทธรณ์ให้เหตุผลว่าภาพ B1 ไม่สามารถใช้เมื่อร่างกายของรัฐเป็นสิ่งที่ท้าทายว่า ข้อยกเว้นการใช้เนื่องจากข้อมูลไม่ได้ถูกกำหนดให้เป็นสาธารณะ   414 s.w.3d ที่ 818 .  ยอมรับของเมือง การโต้แย้ง