Structural functionalism, especially in the work of Talcott Parsons, Robert Merton, and their students and followers, was for many years the dominant sociological theory. However, in the last three decades it has declined dramatically in importance (Chriss, 1995) and, in at least some senses, has receded into the recent history of sociological theory. This decline is reflected in Colomy’s (1990a) description of structural functionalism as a theoretical “tradition.” Structural functionalism is now mainly of historical significance, although it is also notable for the role it played in the emergence of neofunctionalism in the 1980s (Nielsen, 2007b). After offering an overview of structural functionalism, we will discuss neofunctionalism as a possible successor to it as well as an example of the recent movement toward synthesis within sociological theory (Abrahamson, 2001). However, the future of neofunctionalism itself has been cast into doubt by the fact that its founder, Jeffrey Alexander (personal communication, October 17, 1994), has arrived at the conclusion that neofunctionalism “is no longer satisfactory to me.” He states, “I am now separating myself from the movement I started.” For many years, the major alternative to structural functionalism was conflict theory. We will discuss Ralf Dahrendorf’s traditional version of conflict theory, as well as a more recent integrative and synthetic effort by Randall Collins. Before turning to the specifics of structural functionalism and conflict theory, we need, following Thomas Bernard (1983), to place these theories in the broader context of the debate between consensus theories (one of which is structural functionalism) and conflict theories (one of which is the sociological conflict theory that will be discussed in this chapter). Consensus theories see shared norms and values as fundamental to society, focus on social order based on tacit agreements, and view social change as occurring in a slow and orderly fashion. In contrast, conflict theories emphasize the dominance of some social groups by others, see social order as based on manipulation and control by dominant groups, and view social change as occurring rapidly and in a
disorderly fashion as subordinate groups overthrow dominant groups.
Although these criteria broadly define the essential differences between the sociological
theories of structural functionalism and conflict theory, Bernard’s view is that
the disagreement is far broader and has “been a recurring debate that has taken a variety
of different forms throughout the history of Western thought” (1983:6). Bernard
traced the debate back to ancient Greece (and the differences between Plato [consensus]
and Aristotle [conflict]) and through the history of philosophy. Later, in sociology, the
debate was joined by (the conflict theorist is listed first) Marx and Comte, Simmel and
Durkheim, and Dahrendorf and Parsons. We already have examined briefly the ideas of
the first two pairs of sociologists (although, as we have seen, their work is far broader
than is implied by the label “conflict” or “consensus” theorist); in this chapter we
examine Dahrendorf’s conflict theory and Parsons’s consensus theory, among others.
Although I emphasize the differences between structural functionalism and conflict
theory, we should not forget that they have important similarities. In fact, Bernard
argues that “the areas of agreement among them are more extensive than the areas of
disagreement” (1983:214). For example, they are both macro-level theories focally
concerned with large-scale social structures and social institutions. As a result, in my
(1980) terms, both theories exist within the same sociological (“social facts”) paradigm
(see the Appendix).