It would be wrong to conclude that debates at these meetings took the form of ethicists trying to tell
scientists how to do science (although we occasionally did come close to this). Instead, the central
feature of the debates was that they became learning experiences for all. One example of this can be
found in an argument that developed over the topic of scientific methodology. Through a series of long
and tortuous discussions spanning several years, our group struggled with the issues of how ethical
theory applies to the scientific method itself. Through these discussions scientists learned to apply
concepts of deception, cheating, and the need to have adequate justification before engaging in such
activities, to the practice of science. Philosophers learned about fundamental distinctions in scientific
research, such as the difference between a failed experiment—one that yields no data—and an experiment
that produces a negative result—a result that contradicts one’s hypothesis. Through debate we came to
what now seems an absurdly obvious conclusion, that a central feature of good scientific method is the
ethical practice of science. However, we came to this conclusion with a heightened understanding on all
sides of why this is so and why important features of both ethics and science make it so.