What is potentiality? Potentiality is conventionally understood as that which is opposed to actuality. This is an Aristotelian inheritance. By definition, what is potential [dynamis δυναμις] is something that is not-yet actual, but that which over time and through the principle of development has the power to actualize [energia ενεργεια]. Potentiality is therefore a kind of power, with an inertial, directional force whose aim is to manifest itself in actuality. This motif can be found in Hegel’s system. For Hegel, Reason is what is capable of actualizing itself; it is a purposive activity that unfolds its inner potentiality (the “in itself”) into explicit actuality (the “for itself”). Marx overturns Hegel and relocates this power of actualizability from subjective thought (Spirit) to the sensuous material activity of man (labor-power). What unites Hegel and Marx is the idea of potentiality as the substrate for the actual world. Yet, insofar as potentiality precedes actuality, it is something that disappears, becomes annulled in its becoming actual. The idea of development intends to bring potentiality to its end [telos τέλοϛ], to realize the teleology of potentiality to actuality. This is why in the contemporary discourse of development what remains merely potential risks the opprobrium of under-development. Potentiality, on this view, is nothing more than what subsists in the peripheral, substance-less shadow of actuality. Giorgio Agamben offers a radically different account of potentiality. “On Potentiality” is Agamben’s critical effort to go beyond the binary of potential/actual. His theoretical gesture is to give form to an aspect of potentiality that is not reducible to actuality, a potentiality that “conserves itself and saves itself in actuality” (184). He therefore identifies a certain kind of persisting , a living-on of potentiality that remains in and for the actual world.
First, Aristotle. The opposition between potentiality and actuality is an opposition that runs through the history of Western philosophy and science; it is an opposition that can be traced back to at least Aristotle’s distinction between dunamis (δυναμις) and energeia (ενεργεια). In De Anima, Aristotle identifies an aporia in sense-phenomena: Why can there be no sensation without an external object? How is it that we cannot sense sensation in-itself? Aristotle’s response to this aporia is that sensation is not actual, it is potential. Because sensation in-itself is potential, it can only be sensed when it has an external object. From this Aristotelian insight, Agamben specifies a mode of existence of potentiality: potentiality is the “existence of a non-Being, a presence of an absence,” that is to say, a form of privation (179). Potentiality is an existence of a non-Being because to say that something has potential implies that this potentiality exists but that, at the same time, it does not exist as an actual thing. As we shall see, the paradoxical existence of this non-Being will be of great importance for Agamben in developing a different notion of human action and freedom.
In Aristotle’s metaphysics and physics, there are two faculties of potentialities: generic and existing potentiality. An example of generic potentiality is the potential of a child to learn. The kind of potentiality expressed in an architect who is said to have the potential to build or a poet who has the potential to write poems is what is called an existing potentiality. The distinction between the two is that in generic potentiality one suffers an alteration, as in a child who, in the process of learning, needs to become other than itself in order to realize its full potential or, what is the same thing, to be actual. Existing potentiality, on the other hand, implies the idea of possession, a kind of “having,” in which one has the choice of whether or not to bring this knowledge/potentiality into actuality. The architect does not have to build, the poet does not have to write, even if both possess, indeed are defined by, their respective potentialities. Existing potentiality therefore contains the power of negation. Agamben focuses on the second form of potentiality, and derives from it an extended notion of potentiality as not simply a potentiality to do this or that thing (i.e., a capacity), but also as a specific “mode of existence” that can simultaneously mean to not do or not be. In doing so, Agamben isolates an aspect of potentiality that is irreducible to actuality, one that maintains itself precisely as potentiality. Agamben wishes to give analytic priority and philosophical valence to this aspect of potentiality.
What would a potentiality that dwells in non-actuality look like? What form does a potentiality that resists actuality take? Agamben likens it to a shadow [skotos]. Agamben returns to Aristotle’s discussion of sensation, and focuses on his treatment of sight and color. He points out that for Ar
ศักยภาพคืออะไร ศักยภาพตามอัตภาพได้อย่างเข้าใจซึ่งเทียบกับ actuality นี่คือมรดก Aristotelian คำ อะไรมีศักยภาพ [dynamis δυναμις] เป็นสิ่งที่ไม่- ได้ จริง แต่ที่ ตามเวลา และ ตามหลักการของการพัฒนามีอำนาจ actualize [energia ενεργεια] ศักยภาพเป็นดังนั้นชนิดของพลังงาน แรงเฉื่อย ทิศทางการมุ่งหวังจะแสดงตัวเองใน ลายนี้สามารถพบได้ในระบบของ Hegel สำหรับ Hegel เป็นสิ่งที่มีความสามารถในการ actualizing ตัวเอง มันเป็นกิจกรรม purposive ซึ่งศักยภาพภายในตน (การ "ในตัวเอง") ใน actuality ชัดเจน ("ตัวเอง") Marx overturns Hegel และย้ายนี้พลังของ actualizability จากอัตนัยคิด (วิญญาณ) กับกิจกรรมวัสดุอ่อน ๆ คน (ไฟแรง) อะไรทได้ Hegel และมาร์กซ์เป็นความคิดของศักยภาพเป็นพื้นผิวโลกที่แท้จริง ยัง ทำภาพธนบัตรศักยภาพก่อนหน้า actuality มันเป็นสิ่งที่หายไป กลายเป็นโมฆะในความเป็นจริง ความคิดของการพัฒนาตั้งใจที่จะนำศักยภาพไปจุดสิ้นสุด [telos τέλοϛ], ตระหนัก teleology ของศักยภาพการ actuality นี้คือเหตุผลในวาทกรรมร่วมสมัยของการพัฒนาสิ่งที่เหลืออยู่มีเพียงความเสี่ยง opprobrium พัฒนาขีด ศักยภาพ ในมุมมองนี้ คืออะไรมากกว่าอะไร subsists เงาต่อพ่วง สารน้อยกว่าของ actuality Giorgio Agamben มีบัญชีแตกต่างกันอย่างสิ้นเชิงของศักยภาพ "เปิดศักยภาพ" เป็นความพยายามสำคัญของ Agamben เหนือไบนารีของศักยภาพจริง ท่าทางทฤษฎีของเขาจะให้แบบฟอร์มข้อมูลด้านศักยภาพที่ไม่ reducible กับ actuality ศักยภาพการที่ "ประหยัดตัวเอง และช่วยตัวเองใน" (184) เขาจึงระบุบางชนิดสนอง นั่งเล่นบนของศักยภาพที่อยู่ใน และโลกจริง First, Aristotle. The opposition between potentiality and actuality is an opposition that runs through the history of Western philosophy and science; it is an opposition that can be traced back to at least Aristotle’s distinction between dunamis (δυναμις) and energeia (ενεργεια). In De Anima, Aristotle identifies an aporia in sense-phenomena: Why can there be no sensation without an external object? How is it that we cannot sense sensation in-itself? Aristotle’s response to this aporia is that sensation is not actual, it is potential. Because sensation in-itself is potential, it can only be sensed when it has an external object. From this Aristotelian insight, Agamben specifies a mode of existence of potentiality: potentiality is the “existence of a non-Being, a presence of an absence,” that is to say, a form of privation (179). Potentiality is an existence of a non-Being because to say that something has potential implies that this potentiality exists but that, at the same time, it does not exist as an actual thing. As we shall see, the paradoxical existence of this non-Being will be of great importance for Agamben in developing a different notion of human action and freedom.In Aristotle’s metaphysics and physics, there are two faculties of potentialities: generic and existing potentiality. An example of generic potentiality is the potential of a child to learn. The kind of potentiality expressed in an architect who is said to have the potential to build or a poet who has the potential to write poems is what is called an existing potentiality. The distinction between the two is that in generic potentiality one suffers an alteration, as in a child who, in the process of learning, needs to become other than itself in order to realize its full potential or, what is the same thing, to be actual. Existing potentiality, on the other hand, implies the idea of possession, a kind of “having,” in which one has the choice of whether or not to bring this knowledge/potentiality into actuality. The architect does not have to build, the poet does not have to write, even if both possess, indeed are defined by, their respective potentialities. Existing potentiality therefore contains the power of negation. Agamben focuses on the second form of potentiality, and derives from it an extended notion of potentiality as not simply a potentiality to do this or that thing (i.e., a capacity), but also as a specific “mode of existence” that can simultaneously mean to not do or not be. In doing so, Agamben isolates an aspect of potentiality that is irreducible to actuality, one that maintains itself precisely as potentiality. Agamben wishes to give analytic priority and philosophical valence to this aspect of potentiality.
What would a potentiality that dwells in non-actuality look like? What form does a potentiality that resists actuality take? Agamben likens it to a shadow [skotos]. Agamben returns to Aristotle’s discussion of sensation, and focuses on his treatment of sight and color. He points out that for Ar
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