tions to reiteration of the influence, rarely particularized, of
"natural law,"58 and the doctrine of natural law itself suggests
the modes of analysis, much practiced since the Middle Ages by which political problems are resolved by the unique determinations
of Reason or Will. Aristotle's vocabulary and distinctions,
the formal organizations of the study of politics and
of the institutions studied in it, have contributed recurrent
terms to the long literature of utopian projected states, to the
scientific discussiono f politics, to the pamphleteeringp reparation
for governments, and even to the language in which laws
and constitutions have been written and interpreted: thus, to
mention only the most obvious cases, the formal distinction of
the parts of a constitution has furnished, by way of Montesquieu,
the practical precept of the division of powers, and Aristotle's
manner of differentiating six states has become, more
than any other classificationo f states, part of political language.
In general, however, the effect of this formalizing of Aristotle's
terminology and theory may be seen in the tendency of the
two end-terms of his dialectic, the individual and the state,
which are determined in endless ways each relative to the other,
to become absolute in such fashion that all political problems
may be treated as instances of the opposition of rights and
duties, or even of Individualism and the Common Good. Even
more subtle and pervasive, however, has been the tendency of
Absolute Goods, when long established in discussion, to be
translated, with little effort or consequence, into the actions or
intentions which are turned to them; when philosophers have
tired of formal causes, entitized as eternal beings, they have
sought solace, if not a different analysis, in efficient causes,
finding the common good in some manifestation of a common
will, or accounting for political organizations, which had been
called "natural," as conventional associations established by social contracts. This tendency repeats the fate which has befallen
Aristotle's physical theory, for in politics as in physics
all four of the Aristotelian causes have been reduced to efficient
causes-contracts and covenants have been advanced as efficient
causes to account for the pursuit of the "common good,"
the division of powers has been made the efficient cause of the
persistence of states, not the form of their organization-and
the tendency reached its completion at the close of the Middle
Ages, when Aristotle's political theory was no longer fitted in a
scheme dominated by "eternal law," in the first and most influential
of modern political theories, that of Machiavelli, which
is based almost exclusively on considerations, derived from
Aristotle's treatment of efficient causes in the Politics and of
persuasioni n the Rhetorico, f means by which to move or maintain
a state.
tions to reiteration of the influence, rarely particularized, of"natural law,"58 and the doctrine of natural law itself suggeststhe modes of analysis, much practiced since the Middle Ages by which political problems are resolved by the unique determinationsof Reason or Will. Aristotle's vocabulary and distinctions,the formal organizations of the study of politics andof the institutions studied in it, have contributed recurrentterms to the long literature of utopian projected states, to thescientific discussiono f politics, to the pamphleteeringp reparationfor governments, and even to the language in which lawsand constitutions have been written and interpreted: thus, tomention only the most obvious cases, the formal distinction ofthe parts of a constitution has furnished, by way of Montesquieu,the practical precept of the division of powers, and Aristotle'smanner of differentiating six states has become, morethan any other classificationo f states, part of political language.In general, however, the effect of this formalizing of Aristotle'sterminology and theory may be seen in the tendency of thetwo end-terms of his dialectic, the individual and the state,which are determined in endless ways each relative to the other,to become absolute in such fashion that all political problemsmay be treated as instances of the opposition of rights andduties, or even of Individualism and the Common Good. Evenmore subtle and pervasive, however, has been the tendency ofAbsolute Goods, when long established in discussion, to betranslated, with little effort or consequence, into the actions orintentions which are turned to them; when philosophers havetired of formal causes, entitized as eternal beings, they havesought solace, if not a different analysis, in efficient causes,finding the common good in some manifestation of a commonwill, or accounting for political organizations, which had beencalled "natural," as conventional associations established by social contracts. This tendency repeats the fate which has befallenAristotle's physical theory, for in politics as in physicsall four of the Aristotelian causes have been reduced to efficientcauses-contracts and covenants have been advanced as efficientcauses to account for the pursuit of the "common good,"the division of powers has been made the efficient cause of thepersistence of states, not the form of their organization-andthe tendency reached its completion at the close of the MiddleAges, when Aristotle's political theory was no longer fitted in ascheme dominated by "eternal law," in the first and most influentialof modern political theories, that of Machiavelli, whichis based almost exclusively on considerations, derived fromAristotle's treatment of efficient causes in the Politics and ofpersuasioni n the Rhetorico, f means by which to move or maintaina state.
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