It is noticed that there was asymmetry of information between the agents, holders of the information, and
the principals, users of the information, causing agency problems, which according to Ross et al. (2009),
occur when directors and officers tend to maximize the resources over which they have control or, in
broader terms, would tend to maximize their power, or wealth in the firm, without caring about the
companies’ shareholders.
In the cases analyzed in this study, the companies used derivatives as financial instruments and, at
times, exhibited high results with their use. These results benefited their directors, both in the form of
salary rewards, and due to the actual valuation of the company. However, the goals of their shareholders,
especially the minority shareholders that depend on the dissemination and degree of disclosure of the
standardized financial statements (SFS), were not taken into account.
Damodaran (1997) very clearly explains the classical objective function of the company, which implies
also considering the company’s social function and its commitments to stakeholders as a background.
This is a premise assumed as part of the study. However, the main focus of this survey is on the
stockholders and on the objective tacitly imposed on the officers and directors of maximizing the wealth of
the owners.