Apart from the problems posed by debates concerning organizational ontology and the nature of theories of individual learning, the cognitive perspective presents a third difficulty: its proposition (often implicit) that learning for organizations is the same as learning for individuals. This is a difficulty for several reasons. In a fundamental sense, it does not follow from anything essential about organizations or about learning that learning must be the same for individuals and organizations. Nor is it clear how two things that are in so many ways so obviously different as individuals and organizations could nonetheless carry out identical or even equivalent activities. Further, even if it were shown that organizations and individuals are ontologically equivalent in the possession of cognitive capacities required for learning, it would not necessarily follow that they would both learn in the same fashion or, as Weick (1991) notes, that the results of their learning would be the same. Indeed, among individuals, we same. Indeed, even among individuals, we can observe significantly different “learning styles.”2 This issue has been left largely unaddressed by theorists of organizational learning