Section 106 does indeed speak of ''unlawful'' reproduction, distribution, or communication to the public of a work or of an adaptation or a transformation of a work. That is to say, such acts are ''unlawful'' when occurring otherwise than in a manner allowed by law and without the copyright owner's consent. One might then come to the somewhat imprecise conclusion that, in view of the comprehensive grant of exploitation rights under Section 15, this criminal provision comes very close to adopting a general concept of the infringement, as does the civil provision. But the difference between them lies precisely in the fact that the acts punished under Section 106 refer exclusively to the exploitation rights of the author.
Infringement of moral rights, on the contrary, does not on the whole call for criminal sanctions, although Section 107 does make exceptions of two special cases. These cases involve criminal sanctions for wrongful designation of authorship on works of graphic and sculptural arts, namely in cases of misdesignation of authorship on the original of such a work without the consent of the author, as well as in cases of misdesignation of authorship on copies, adaptations or transformations of an artistic work so as to pass them off as originals. Otherwise, infringement of moral rights, as these are established in Sections 12 through 14, is not covered by criminal sanctions. Further, pursuant to this restriction of criminal sanctions relative to infringement of moral rights, mere infringement of Section 62 (prohibition of modifications) or of Section 63 (indication of source) within the uses permitted by the limitations of copyright8)_and_footnotes(n197);.vk n197 is also not met with criminal penalties. Of course, according to Section 97, civil sanctions, in all cases, would be available.
Section 106 does indeed speak of ''unlawful'' reproduction, distribution, or communication to the public of a work or of an adaptation or a transformation of a work. That is to say, such acts are ''unlawful'' when occurring otherwise than in a manner allowed by law and without the copyright owner's consent. One might then come to the somewhat imprecise conclusion that, in view of the comprehensive grant of exploitation rights under Section 15, this criminal provision comes very close to adopting a general concept of the infringement, as does the civil provision. But the difference between them lies precisely in the fact that the acts punished under Section 106 refer exclusively to the exploitation rights of the author.
Infringement of moral rights, on the contrary, does not on the whole call for criminal sanctions, although Section 107 does make exceptions of two special cases. These cases involve criminal sanctions for wrongful designation of authorship on works of graphic and sculptural arts, namely in cases of misdesignation of authorship on the original of such a work without the consent of the author, as well as in cases of misdesignation of authorship on copies, adaptations or transformations of an artistic work so as to pass them off as originals. Otherwise, infringement of moral rights, as these are established in Sections 12 through 14, is not covered by criminal sanctions. Further, pursuant to this restriction of criminal sanctions relative to infringement of moral rights, mere infringement of Section 62 (prohibition of modifications) or of Section 63 (indication of source) within the uses permitted by the limitations of copyright8)_and_footnotes(n197);.vk n197 is also not met with criminal penalties. Of course, according to Section 97, civil sanctions, in all cases, would be available.
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